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Testing the Origins of the Family Patrimony 
in Everyday Law* 
Nicholas KASIRER** 
This essay seeks to reevaluaee the origins of the family patrimoyy by 
challenging the idea that the provisions introduced into the Civil Code of 
Québec in 1989 amounted to new law. The family patrimoyy is not simply a 
statutory trust borrowed maladroitly from Ontario, nor does it reflect a 
moral postulate that, prior to 1989, had no legal status. It may be argued, 
in advance of sociological study, that the family patrimoyy should be 
understood as refleciing customayy norms that were already present in the 
Quebec legal order at the time of its enactment. Where wealth is accumu-
lated by the spouses during the period that marriage is lived as a joint 
economic endeavou,, rules of everyday law may require the sharing of 
certain property without regard to which of them has formal title thereto. 
These customayy norms, obscured doctrinally by a modern disinclination 
among jurists to look beyond state-made law and its adjuncss in the regu-
lation of married life, are potent sources of family propetty law. Once the 
manner in which everyday law complements the formal law of matrimonial 
property is made plain, it becomes apparent that the claim to a share of the 
famlly patrimony is not, in fac,, a break with tradition in Quebecss Civil law 
of famlly property. 
Le présent article vise à resituer les origines du patrimoine familial, en 
remettant en cause l'opinion selon laquelle les dispositions législatives 
adoptées en 1989 expriment du droit nouveau. Si le patrimoine familial 
n 'est pas simplemett la transplantation maladroite d'une fiducie statutaire 
ontarienne, il n'est pas non plus le reflet d'un postulat moral qui nnaurait 
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eu, avant 1989, aucune consistance juridiqu.. Même en dehors de toute 
étude sociologique, on peut formuler l'hypothèse que le patrimoine familial 
consacee des normes coutumières déjà présentes dans l'ordre juridique 
québécois au momett de son adopiion. Pendant la période où le mariage 
constitue notamment une entreprise économique commun,, les règles du 
droit usuel dicteraient que les époux partagent certaines richesses accumu-
lées par eux sans égard aux droits formels sur les biens en quesiion. Ces 
normes coutumières, obscurcies par une tendance moderne chez les juristes 
à s'en tenir au droit étatique pour connaître la teneur du droit matrimonial, 
forment néanmoins des sources importantes du droit patrimonial de la 
famille. Une foss étabiie la manière dont le droit usuel complète le droit 
formel de la famille, on constate que la base juridique de la réclamation 
d'une part du patrimoine familial ne marque pas de rupture, dans les faits, 
avec la tradition du droit civil québécoss au regard du droit patrimonial de 
lafamille. 
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An uneasy relationship between love and money befuddles the law of 
family property, set as it is on the hopeless mission of forcing the patrimonial 
and the extrapatrimonial onto separate legal paths. Try to explain, for 
example,—in legal terms — why spouses share property. Love and hate 
encourage married people to behave with apparent irrationality as private 
law actors, sharing property when they are not obliged to and refusing to do 
so even when the state threatens them with its most powerful tools for the 
imposition of its will '. At the outset of marriage and at its often difficult end, 
1. This is occasionally recognized by the courts, as it was in one case in which spouses 
fought over the family patrimony at divorce «pour des raisons qui sont plus d'ordre 
personnel et psychologique que financier»: Droit de lafamille —1395, [1993] R.J.Q. 
1659, 1662 (Moisan J.) (C.A.). 
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wives and husbands seem stubbornly disinclined to separate feelings from 
finances. Modernity has not yet managed to upset stereotype here. The 
dreamy insouciance of the newly weds' claim that they can live on love is all 
too often matched by the angry recklessness with which the same two, if 
given the chance, grab at family property when things go wrong. 
A similar malaise afflicts the Civil Code of Québec 's « family patri-
mony », despite an earnest undertaking, from the legislature, as to certainty 
of purpose2. The rules, which are designed to impose the sharing in value of 
certain of the spouses' essential assets at the end of married life3, seem to 
add to the confusion as to why property should be divided. On what basis 
does sharing proceed ? Is it as a mere incident of marriage, as its inclusion 
in the Civil Code's primary regime would suggest? Is one spouse being 
rewarded for contribution — direct or indirect, real or imagined—to the 
wealth of the other as a legislative answer to the thorny problem of unjust 
enrichment in marriage ? Could the share in the family patrimony be a bonus 
for good behaviour, on the slightly crazy theory, suggested by art. 422 C.C., 
that « bad faith » can disentitle a spouse to his or her equal share ? The 
uncertainty, felt most pointedly by spouses and their legal advisers, is 
shared by scholars who have tried and failed to reconcile the family patri-
mony with existing legal institutions and who, understandably, are shy to 
accept what appears to be the sudden imposition of a Common law statu-
tory remedy into the conceptually distinct civilian realm of matrimonial 
property law4. 
What is the source, then, of the idea that spouses must share the value 
of certain property regardless of which of them has the right of ownership 
therein ? The device does carry with it an air of novelty. It is certainly true, 
2. The policy basis of the family patrimony was alluded to in the title of the legislation 
which brought this new institution to the Civil Code : An Act to amend the Civil Code 
of Québec and other legislation in order to favour economic equality between spouses, 
S.Q. 1989, c. 55, as amended by S.Q. 1990, c. 18, and later consolidated as arts 414-426 
C.C. (S.Q. 1991, c. 64). 
3. Arts 414-426 C.C. provide for the establishment, as a mandatory incident of marriage, 
of a « family patrimony » composed of the spouses' homes, furniture, cars and pension 
plans. While this mass is notionally created as of the date of marriage, « regardless of 
which one of [the spouses] holds a right of ownership in that property» (art. 414), its 
net value is divisible only at the dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon legal 
separation (see esp. arts 416-418 C.C). 
4. For a colourful expression of the view that the Common law connections of the family 
patrimony render it a legislative «intrus» into the Civilian tradition, see E. CAPARROS, 
«Le patrimoine familial: une qualification difficile», (1994) 25 R.C.D. 251, 266. 
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if one puts store in the debates of the legislature5, that Equity's constructive 
idea that marriage is a joint economic endeavour which mandates sharing is 
relevant to the presence of the rules on the family patrimony in Quebec's 
Civil Code. The apparent newness is compounded by its mandatory charac-
ter as the centrepiece of a new matrimonial public order in modern family 
law. Newness turns to affront for traditionalists irked by the legislature's 
apparently carefree manipulation of the time-honoured conceptual vocabu-
lary of the Civil law of property : a « patrimony » that is nothing of the sort, 
a «partition» in the absence of true indivision—even the usual basis for 
titularity between persons and property seems bent out of shape by the text 
of the Code6. The family patrimony has generally been seen as a new, 
atraditional and, in many circles, bad idea. 
This essay seeks to reevaluate the origins of the family patrimony by 
challenging the idea that what was introduced in 1989 was new law. There is 
certainly a closeness between the Common law statutory regimes for the 
division of family assets and the family patrimony7, but the connections 
should not be overstated : Equity and its statutory cousins are not the source 
of the family patrimony, they merely provided the means for expressing, in 
the prose of positive law, a legal idea already present in Quebec's own droit 
commun. The family patrimony is not simply a statutory trust borrowed 
maladroitly from Ontario, nor does it reflect a moral postulate that, prior to 
1989, had no legal status. Scholars are right in suggesting that the new 
institution has no obvious link to existing structures in the positive law of 
Quebec matrimonial property. But in dismissing the family patrimony as a 
foreign legal idea, some have overestimated its status as a legal transplant 
and underestimated its local character. 
It is possible, in advance of sociological study, to suggest that the roots 
of the family patrimony can be traced to customary norms already present 
in the Quebec legal order at the time of its enactment. Notwithstanding the 
5. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, Journal des débats (8 June 1989) p. 6490 (per Hon. M. GA-
GNON-TREMBLAY). By connecting the family patrimony to legislative schemes such as 
the Ontario Family Law Reform Act, the Minister for the Status of Women allied the 
new rules with what is often described as a « statutory constructive trust» for marriage 
in Common law Canada. 
6. This latter point is exemplified by the difficulty in characterizing the interest of the 
non-owner spouse in the mass of the family patrimony prior to the end of marriage, 
especially given the terms of art. 421 C.C., as discussed infra. 
7. For an argument that the Common law legislative experience may serve as a useful guide 
for understanding the family patrimony see N. KASIRER, « Couvrez cette communauté 
que je ne saurais voir : Equity and Fault in the Division of Quebec's Family Patrimony », 
(1994) 25 R.G.D. 569, 575-583, 586-589. 
N. KASIRER Family Patrimony 799 
terms of a marriage contract or the rules of a chosen matrimonial regime, 
married life may have brought with it, prior to 1989, the establishment of a 
family fund of property — a «communauté taisible8», to borrow a term 
from the très ancien droit—according to which each spouse had a legal 
entitlement to a share of notionally family property. Where riches are 
accumulated during the period of vie commune that marriage is said to 
embody, rules of everyday law may require the spouses to share that 
property without regard as to which of them has formal title thereto. Instead 
of looking to the textual exposition of matrimonial law in the civil codes as 
a point of reference for the family patrimony, one might better understand 
the new institution against the backdrop of a long-standing informal tradi-
tion among Quebec spouses for sharing the financial ups and downs of 
marriage. This communitarian sense—sometimes described as an esprit 
communautaire—may itself reflect a customary norm, obscured doctrin-
ally by a modern disinclination among jurists to look beyond state-made law 
and its adjuncts as sources of the law of matrimonial property. 
From this perspective, the apparent revolution in the law of marriage 
of 1989 takes on a more benign aspect. The idea that spouses must share 
essential family property may not have been an impulsive legislative « dik-
tat9 », but rather the consecration of an existing practice so well-entrenched 
that it constituted a custom having legal status. Much of the law of family 
property can be traced to patterns of spousal behaviour which are them-
selves potent sources of private law and this may well be true for the family 
patrimony. Once the manner in which customary law complements the 
positive law of matrimonial regimes is sketched (1.), it becomes apparent 
that the claim to a share of the family patrimony is not, in the end, a break 
with tradition in Quebec's Civil law of family property (2.). 
8. F. OLIVIER-MARTIN, Histoire de la Coutume de la Prévôté et Vicomte de Paris, t. II, 
fasc. I, Paris, Éd. Ernest Leroux, 1926, p. 149, noted the existence of a «communauté 
taisible [qui] ne porte que sur les meubles et les acquêts, c'est-à-dire les acquisitions 
faites pendant que dure la vie commune» arising spontaneously in the 13th century law 
of marriage. 
9. The family patrimony was so described by J. PINEAU, « La protection des conjoints : 
conventions matrimoniales ou société à parts égales?», in Conférences sur le nouveau 
Code civil du Québec: Actes des Journées louisianaises 1991, Cowansville, Éditions 
Yvon Biais, 1992, 109, p. 122. Professor Pineau's compelling indictment of the family 
patrimony rested primarily on his objections to the imperative character of the reform. 
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1. Custom Obscured in the patrimoine familial 
Do,all spouses have a legal entitlement to one-half of the property 
accumulated by their partners during the time they both were contributing 
to the marriage as a common affective enterprise ? Of course not, says the 
student of the civil codes, mindful that freedom of contract in marriage and 
freedom of willing are the traditional twin pillars of the law of family 
property in Quebec10, and have remained so even since the advent of the 
primary regime to promote economic equality in 198011. Positive law shied 
away from imposing an ethic of sharing property rights in marriage prior to 
1989, preferring a contractual model for matrimonial regimes founded on 
choice, or presumed choice, as a basis for the pooling of the spouses' 
financial interests. Whether through « organized indivision » or a « deferred 
community », sharing has been a feature of marriage for those who « chose » 
to allow community of moveables and acquests or the partnership of ac-
quests, as the case may be, to regulate their financial lives. But in the 
mainstream theory of matrimonial law such a pooling of assets and liabilities 
is optional12. While the shared-property regimes have always enjoyed status 
of legislative model they have never been more than gentle suggestions by 
the codes Indeed prior to the enactment of the family patrimony the idea 
that spouses were forced to share certain property appears from the per-
spective of positive law to stand contra legem Historically the law has 
always left spouses free to avoid sharing beyond the indivision that arose by 
accident or their own design by opting for separate property regimes13 
10. Prior to modern reforms of family law, these pillars rested on former arts 1257-1259 and 
art. 831 Civil Code of Lower Canada (C.C.L.C.). The public order rules in the C.C.L.C. 
affecting property rights of the spouses concerned marital authority (see art. 1259 
C.C.L.C, repealed by S.Q. 1964, c. 66) and thus, in principle, the administration of 
property rather than title thereto, which is our concern here. 
11. See art. 463 C.C.Q., enacted by S.Q. 1980, c. 39, and carried forward as art. 431 C.C. 
While the primary regime initially gave spouses powers over family property, notably 
the family residence and its contents, it shied away from establishing a veritable indivi-
sion or even a deferred common mass as between them. But see former arts 458 to 462 
C.C.Q. (modified by S.Q. 1989, c. 55, at art. 429 C.C), which allowed attribution of 
ownership in the residence and the furniture as a compensatory allowance. 
12. An exception to this was the effect of the rule of the immutability of the matrimonial 
regime : once spouses had adopted, for example, the « organized indivision » of commu-
nity of property at the outset of marriage, that choice could not be changed thereafter 
by virtue of art. 1265 C.C.L.C, repealed by S.Q. 1969, c. 77. 
13. Typically favoured has been separation as to property (see today arts 485-487 C.C). As 
in the past, where simple indivision arises in respect of private property of spouses 
separate as to property, they remain theoretically free to force partition at any time, 
subject to the general rules on partition and, as we will posit infra, the informal law 
imposing sharing during marital life. 
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But another, more measured view is possible. It may be that, prior to 
the legislative initiative of 1989, spouses considered certain property as 
forming a fund of family assets and liabilities — a patrimoine familial in a 
traditional sense of that expression14—held by them together as a neces-
sary consequence of their affective alliance. Preoccupied with a description 
of the complex body of rules that make up the enacted law of matrimonial 
property, scholars have not inquired as to whether such sharing, if it existed, 
was undertaken as a matter of law as much as simple love and affection. Yet 
fired as it may be by love and affection, where the instinct to share is both 
well-established and compelling, popular custom consecrates it as law, 
thereby transforming marriage into a juridical vehicle for the pooling of 
rights and obligations, notwithstanding the texts of the law of matrimonial 
property. Taking the measure of custom is not, of course, merely a matter 
of appearances : the classical theory of informal sources of law, even in its 
most optimistic expression15, typically requires that habit and force of habit 
be joined before popular custom is consecrated as law16. This said, if such 
patterns of behaviour between spouses did exist (1.1), and if spouses felt 
bound to adhere to them (1.2), there is reason to believe that mandatory 
sharing of property was a feature of matrimonial law prior to 1989. 
14. The turn of phrase patrimoine familial has a long-standing currency in the French legal 
tradition, and is occasionally encountered in Quebec literature: see, e.g., E. COLAS, 
« Vers une meilleure protection du patrimoine familial », (1968) 3 R.J.T. 87, passim. Note 
however that the expression has had, along with its rough English-language equivalent 
« family property », a shifting meaning, referring variously to common property in mar-
riage, the legitim and its cousins, rules on intestate succession giving blood relatives a 
better claim than relatives by alliance, patterns of will-making promoting primogeniture 
or the family blood-line over the surviving spouse, anomalous successions and more. 
What I call « family property » in this essay is thus a subset of a broader category which 
one might also style as « marital property ». 
15. For two prominent and enthusiastic accounts of the role of custom as a source of law 
by Quebeckers, see R.A. MACDONALD, «Pour la reconnaissance d'une normativité 
implicite et inférentielle», Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 18, 1986, p. 47, building on ideas 
of Lon Fuller, and J.-G. BELLEY, « Conflit social et pluralisme juridique en sociologie 
du droit», unpubl. doctoral thesis, Paris, Université de Paris II, 1977, pp. 461 s., who 
developed the thinking of Jean Carbonnier. Both make compelling cases for the relevance 
of lex non scripta in the Quebec legal order. 
16. For a classical definition, see K.N. LLEWELLYN and E.A. HOEBEL, The Cheyenne Way : 
Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence, Norman, University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1941, p. 22 : « «custom » [...] is a fused, confused word suggesting at once a very 
general practice and a felt sense of lightness». For a parallel definition by a French 
civilian, cast imaginatively in terms of the «conscience juridique spontanée», see 
J.-L. SOURIOUX, Introduction au droit, 2nd ed., Paris, PUF, 1990, para. 32. 
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1.1 Practice as Basis of Popular Custom for Treating Marriage 
as a Joint Economic Endeavour 
Informal law is generally said to rest on observable fact. Thus in order 
to establish the so-called material element of a custom for sharing property 
in marriage, one must unearth supporting evidence of a pattern of behaviour 
well-anchored in both time and space17. Few would offer that the « what's-
mine-is-yours » ethic as a precise description of how all spouses treat prop-
erty in marriage, but then again few would argue that established practice 
does not, to some extent, follow this idea. While no systematic sociological 
study has yet been undertaken, and since love and trust discourage all but 
the most cynical spouses from keeping accounts, precise research on prac-
tice is difficult. The presentation that follows will be impressionistic, but 
there are scattered signs that spousal behaviour in respect of their property, 
at least in some quarters, reflects a legal idea that marriage is a joint eco-
nomic endeavour rooted in the sharing of essential matrimonial property. 
Long before 1989, sharing was, of course, celebrated by the legislature 
as a central value in marriage on the basis of the content of the applicable 
legal matrimonial regimes. Yet it is not the existence of the regimes of the 
community of moveables and acquests and the partnership of acquests that 
is, for present purposes, of primary consequence, but instead the extent to 
which spouses adhered to these various legislative models for sharing. Such 
adherence may be viewed, from the perspective of the search for signs of 
informal law, as practice that spouses shared wealth in marriage as a matter 
of observable fact. The conventional view is that by sharing property, these 
spouses were following the dictates of the legal regime. But this practice may 
also be viewed as rooted in an independent customary norm. Practice may 
mimic, follow or buttress rules of formal law that promote the sharing of 
property in marriage. But it may also lead by example or stand in defiance 
of the legislated order. Practice thus completes the normative picture given 
by formal law and, perhaps most importantly, may stand in apparent contra-
diction with it. 
17. « Well-anchored » is meant here to suggest of a definite character rather than timeless. 
The latter measure is sometimes required by those who admit the category of custom 
only to set it up as a straw-man. For a compelling argument which shows openness to 
instant custom, including examples drawn from the family context, see L. FULLER, 
«Human Interaction and the Law», in K.I. WINSTON (ed.), The Principles of Social 
Order, Selected Essays of Lon Fuller, Durham, Duke University Press, 1981, 211 esp. 
pp. 266 s. 
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The communitarian sense inherent in the rules associated with the legal 
regimes is, as many have pointed out, one of the defining features of Quebec 
matrimonial law18. Both community of property and the partnership of 
acquests rely heavily on the idea that property garnered by the spouses 
should be shared at dissolution insofar as this property is allied with what 
is described, in today's parlance, as married life as an economic partnership. 
A bias in favour of sharing assets and liabilities, or the value thereof, 
connected with on-going married life is arguably the fundamental orienta-
tion of both of Quebec's legal regimes. Beyond the rules in both regimes that 
characterize income earned by either spouses during the marriage as sus-
ceptible of partition or division, as the case may be19, telling signs of the 
shared-property stamp include, for community of property, the charac-
terization of « reserved property » of married women as common20, the 
similar treatment of «joint acquests21 », and, for the partnership of acquests, 
the legislative decision to characterize income derived from inherited 
property property as acquests22, the presumption of acquests23 and that of 
18. D. BURMAN and J. PINEAU, Le « patrimoine familial » (projet de loi 146), Montreal, 
Éditions Thémis, 1991, p. 2, wrote of the «association des personnes et des biens, 
conception traditionnelle du Code civil» which, they argued, was forgotten in 1989 at 
the time of the enactment of the family patrimony. 
19. For the partnership of acquests, see, e.g., arts 448, 449 and the exceptions at 450 C.C. 
which include and exclude property from the mass of acquests based on the ideal of 
marriage as an economic partnership. Note that art. 466 provides that the court may 
declare the effects of dissolution retroactive to the date the spouses ceased to live 
together, thus consecrating a practice-based — as opposed to the technically defined — 
end to the partnership. For community of property, see, e.g., former arts 1272 and 1280 
C.C.L.C. 
20. See former art. 1425a C.C.L.C, enacted by S.Q. 1930-31, c. 101. The original proposal 
for reserved property, tabled in the Legislative Assembly in 1928, departed from its 
French model and would have characterized such property as private. The law reform 
commission studying proposals to amend community of property reversed this on the 
view that the property was no less acquest property simply because it was earned by 
the married woman : see COMMISSION DES DROITS CIVILS DE LA FEMME, « Droits civils 
de la femme, Deuxième rapport» [Hon. Charles-Edouard Dorion, chair], (1930) 32 
R.duN. 321,348-352. 
21. Former art. 1273 C.C.L.C. created a presumption that immoveables and, after S.Q. 1969, 
c. 77, all property be deemed common unless proven otherwise. 
22. See art. 450 (2) C.C. The original proposal for the partnership of acquests tabled by the 
Civil Code Revision Office would have had this property characterized as private but 
the recommendation was changed in order to reinforce the communitarian aspect of the 
regime : see CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, Report on Matrimonial Regimes, Montreal, 
Éditeur officiel, 1968, pp. 40-41. 
23. Art. 459 C.C, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that property is presumed to 
constitute an acquest unless proven otherwise. 
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indivision24. There is, as one expert has put it, a « sens communautaire25 » in-
herent in the law of matrimonial regimes, premissed upon what another 
scholar has aptly called «le ménage comme communauté économique26». 
Even the regime of separation as to property chooses to err of the side of 
sharing27 thereby reflecting, no doubt, the legislature's idea that marriage 
and sharing are, at some level, unavoidable28. 
But the communitarian orientation inherent in the civil codes does not 
in itself constitute the basis of practice, even where the legislature and others 
insist that the very vocation of the suppletive legal regime is to provide a 
model for spousal behaviour29. It is certainly true that the Quebec legisla-
ture, through its official organs, has never been shy to express its hope that 
the legal regime will find favour with spouses30. Yet practice depends on 
more than aspiration ; instead, practice is evidenced, at least in part, by 
spousal attitudes to the shared-property models offered up by the general 
law. Where spouses adhere to the legal regime in great numbers, this decision 
may reflect a practice consonant with the inclination to share property in 
marriage, assuming—perhaps wishfully a measure of informed consent 
to matrimonial conventions. This behaviour, once isolated, may demon-
strate the material basis of an independent customary norm for sharing in 
marriage. 
24. Art. 460 C.C. provides that property that a spouse cannot prove to be either exclusively 
private or acquests is presumed to be held jointly, in undivided co-ownership. 
25. E. CAPARROS, Les lignes deforce de l'évolution du droit des régimes matrimoniaux en 
droit comparé et québécois, Montreal, PUM, 1975, para. 3. 
26. P. CIOTOLA, « Les conventions matrimoniales au lendemain de la réforme des régimes 
matrimoniaux», (1976) 1 C.P. du N, 157, para. 30, used this image to describe the 
classification of property under the partnership of acquests. 
27. See the presumption of indivision created by art. 487 C.C. In France, it has recently been 
argued that courts should fix on property as «value» instead of «title», especially by 
manipulating this presumption of indivision, in order to recognize the «equities» in 
separation of property : see M. STORCK, «Le titre ou la finance? Le droit de propriété 
dans les régimes de séparation de biens», D.1994.I.Chr.8.61, 61-62. 
28. See, e.g., the « Explanatory Notes » to the legislation enacting the partnership of acquests 
(reproducing a report of the Civil Code Revision Office) : « the union created by marriage 
necessarily gives rise to a certain mingling of the material interests of husband and wife » 
QUEBEC, Bill 10, An Act respecting matrimonial regimes. First Reading, Quebec City, 
Éditeur officiel, 1969, p. I. 
29. This is no doubt an aspiration for a regime designed to apply to all spouses who do not 
expressly choose otherwise : see E. CAPARROS, Les régimes matrimoniaux au Québec, 
3rd ed., Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1988, para. 137. 
30. See, e.g., QUEBEC, op. cit., note 28, « Explanatory Notes », p. Ill : «[a]s a matter of sound 
legislative policy, the legal regime must not only respect a certain ideal, it must also suit 
the majority ». 
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Historically, statistics on the choice of matrimonial regimes have been 
unreliable : the central data bank of such information was only established 
in 196931. Certainly there is evidence of a long-standing sense, expressed in 
legal literature, that spouses should adopt the applicable legal regime, very 
often advanced for reasons of conservative political ideology according to 
which community of property represented the ideal familial division of 
labour32. Recent data, more reliably gathered, shows a relative increase in 
marriages subject to the partnership of acquests since its inception in 197033. 
Some have seen this as a sign that Quebeckers have accepted the so-called 
esprit communautaire as appropriately applicable to them34. This said, the 
number of marriages has decreased in recent years, compensated in part by 
a higher incidence of cohabitation outside marriage. From the perspective 
of the law in the books, these unions proceed in a manner analogous to 
separation of property, thus apparently undercutting the import of the 
statistics favouring partnership of acquests35. 
Assuming practice does confirm a measure of social acceptance of the 
legal regime as the appropriate device for property relations in marriage, this 
practice would have to be carefully analyzed. Patterns of behaviour would 
be immensely sensitive to historical fact and there are good reasons to think 
that they varied widely according to criteria that, once identified, would give 
meaningful shape to the normative character of financial decisions in 
marriage. It has been plausibly suggested that socio-economic influences 
have been relevant to the decision to adopt separate as to property36, 
that the rural-urban divide provides a basis for analyzing contractual 
31. An Act respecting the central register of matrimonial regimes, S.Q. 1969, c. 78. For an 
early call on the urgency to establish such a data bank in order to facilitate commercial 
transactions, see [J.-J. LEFEBVRE], «Chez nous et ailleurs: Banque d'états matrimo-
niaux », (1949) 52 R. du N. 165. 
32. A strongly-worded presentation of this thesis is found in the report of the Quebec 
commission reviewing matrimonial law as a prior to the enactment of S.Q. 1930-31, c. 
101 : see COMMISSION DES DROITS CIVILS DE LA FEMME, op. cit., note 20, pp. 311-314. 
Law reformers made a rather unscientific but not necessarily implausible claim that 
community of property was applicable to at least 80 % of Quebec marriages at the time. 
33. See A. COSSETTE, « Statistiques en matière du manage», (1991) 93 R. du N. 536, 538. 
34. See J.-P. SENÉCAL, « La réforme québécoise instituant le patrimoine familial : la recher-
che d'un nouvel équilibre », in Conférences sur le nouveau Code civil du Québec : Actes 
des Journées louisianaises 1991, op. cit., note 9, p. 145. 
35. It must be noted, however, that there is a widespread insensitivity in legal literature to 
the informal law which regulates so-called de facto marriages : see infra. 
36. Historians B. BRADBURY et ai, « Property and Marriage : The Law and Practice in Early 
Nineteenth-Century Montreal», Histoire sociale/Social History, vol. 26, 1993, pp. 10-14, 
have suggested that early 19th century marriage contracts reveal that the marriage 
contract was an instrument of the bourgeois propertied classes. 
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behaviour37 and, more impressionistically, that cultural attitudes to property 
can be measured by the choice of regime38. 
Yet there are further signs, again of imperfect probative weight, that 
spouses are following something other than the dictates of enacted law in 
adhering to the legal regime. Some have rooted, in occasionally florid terms, 
community of property in a « natural law » which has a separate existence 
from the text of the Code39. At different times in Quebec's legal history, the 
normative force of the legal regime has been situated on a plane other than 
that of state-made injunction in other terms40, often coloured by personal 
ideological projects41. It may be that the communitarian sense that experts 
so often allude to as the core of the rules of the Code is in fact rooted 
outside of the official law in a customary norm42. French jurist Jean 
37. One vivid if anecdotal account of the rural perspective is found in C.-É. GAGNON, 
Mémoires d'un notaire de campagne, Saint-Laurent, Éditions du Septentrion, 1990, 
pp. 89-91. 
38. For a colourful though slightly suspect explanation of how English-speaking and 
French-speaking couples approach the signing of the marriage contract differently, see 
H. TURGEON, «Matrimonial Property Law in the Province of Quebec», in W. FRIED-
MANN (ed.), Matrimonial Property Law, t. 2, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955, 
pp. 144 s. 
39. See, e.g., P. AZARD, «Introduction», in R. COMTOIS, Traité théorique et pratique de la 
communauté de biens, Montreal, Rec. dr. et juris., 1964, p. 9, who wrote: «lorsque l'on 
examine à fond la question, aussi bien sous l'angle du droit que de la morale, on serait 
tenté de suggérer que le principe d'une certaine mise en commun des biens des époux 
fait partie du droit naturel, en ce sens qu'il découle de la nature même et des fins de 
l'institution du mariage». 
40. See, e.g., P. PAQUETTE, « Notre régime de séparation de biens», (1921) 23 R. du N. 121, 
124 : « C'est pourtant un principe élémentaire de justice que les biens acquis et gagnés 
par les époux, vivant ensemble, devraient appartenir également à l'un et à l'autre. Bien 
que travaillant chacun dans une sphère différente, ils sont cependant deux collaborateurs 
d'une seule et même œuvre : la fondation de la famille. » For a variation, see R. COMTOIS, 
op. cit., note 39, para. 393-394. 
41. For jurist M. GÉRIN-LAJOIE, Sauvons nos lois françaises. La Communauté légale, 
Montreal, Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste, 1927, pp. 4-5, community of proper-
ty was based on an ancestral conception of marriage for French Canada, bound up in 
Quebec's « pensée française » and constituted part of its « patrimoine national ». Others 
linked its persuasive force to a brand of Roman Catholic thinking : e.g., C.-E. DORION, 
«La philosophie du Code civil», (1925-26) 4 /?. du D. 134, 144-145 and 201. 
42. For an arch-conservative presentation of this thesis by a judge and matrimonial law 
reformer, see C.-E. DORION, « La communauté de biens : Pourquoi faut-il la maintenir 
dans notre Code?», (1928-29) 7 R. du D. 323, who argued that community of property 
was anchored in custom and had to be maintained because « [n]os gens connaissent les 
coutumes ; ils ignorent la loi » (p. 327). I am grateful to Sylvio Normand for this reference. 
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Carbonnier has written of the «persévérance de l'aspiration communau-
taire43 » which, while consonant with some of the principles of the legal 
regime in France, seems in many respects stronger and more all-encompass-
ing than the terms of the Code civil. In Quebec, leading experts Jean Pineau 
and Danielle Burman have spoken of the « mœurs québécoises » which 
embrace a variation of the continental attitude towards sharing of prop-
erty44. It may well be that the « aspiration » alluded to by Carbonnier and 
the «mœurs» spoken of by Pineau and Burman are not inherent in law's 
texts but instead in the people that feel them. In other words, the practices 
sensed may be rooted in a popular custom that, to a greater or lesser extent, 
is mimicked by the legal regimes. 
This custom would be secondum legem — in conformity with made 
law — and may serve to prop up the legislative model where the legislature 
has accurately defined the parameters of the customary norm. The success 
of the legal regime at any given point in time, if measured in terms of its 
public appeal, would depend on how closely it fit with existing custom. 
Custom becomes, in the words of English jurist CK. Allen, «the raw 
material of law45 » ; it shapes official law, it leads it and, on occasion, custom 
is led by it. The text of the Civil Code, where it shadows existing custom, 
sits on the firm ground of what Lon Fuller described as the « interactional 
foundations of enacted law46 » ; certainly there are many instances of Que-
bec matrimonial law reform where such an argument could be mounted 
compellingly47. It may be that, wittingly or unwittingly, the makers of the 
formal law of matrimonial property have sought to reproduce existing 
attitudes and informal legal practices. To take an early example, this was no 
doubt the case at codification in respect of permissible changes to the 
43. See J. CARBONNIER « Préface», in M.-P. CHAMPENOIS-MARMIER and M. FAUCHEUX, Le 
manage et l'argent, Paris, PUF, 1981, p. 15, in which Carbonnier noted a survey which 
showed that many French couples believed that their financial relations were governed 
by what would amount to a «communauté universelle». 
44. See J. PINEAU and D. BURMAN, Les effets du manage, Montreal, Éditions Thémis, 1984, 
p. 2. 
45. C.K. ALLEN, Law in the Making, 6th ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 62. 
46. See L. FULLER, loc. cit., note 17, 230. 
47. Consider an obscure example. The rules relating to the conventional regime of the 
exclusion of community (former art. 1414 C.C.L.C. et seq.) were repealed, according to 
Hon. Claire Kirkland-Casgrain, Minister responsible for the major reform of 1964 (S.Q. 
1964, c. 66), because it was «presque disparu»: QUEBEC, La capacité juridique de la 
femme mariée dans le Québec (Bill 16), by C. Kirkland-Casgrain, Quebec City, Office 
d'information et de publicité, 1964, p. 14. 
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marriage contract48 and, more importantly, with the adoption of the commu-
nity of moveables and acquests, if we allow ourselves the inference based on 
the delightfully ambiguous expression « the general laws and customs of the 
country » found in former art. 1260, para. 1, C.C.L.C.49. 
While the popularity of the partnership of acquests may indeed be 
explained by its overlap with a custom secondum legem which consecrates 
sharing to marriage, it is also possible to argue that the practice of sharing 
illustrates that formal and informal law have not always coincided com-
pletely. One fertile ground for testing this is to study the behaviour of 
spouses who do not adopt a shared-property regime. Do they share ? If so, 
does the communitarian sense that they thereby express have a normative 
basis ? It may be that sharing undertaken by spouses who are not « bound » 
to do so reposes on everyday norms that completes the sparse rules in the 
Code that make up the regime of separation as to property. 
The first area for inquiry should be the marriage contract given that 
spouses who choose to depart from the legal regime have had to appear 
before a notary to consecrate the choice in authentic form. Again, systematic 
research on these valuable sociological sources has yet to be undertaken50. 
But there is a long-standing appreciation, in legal literature, of perceived 
practice : where spouses adopt separation as to property, the husband has 
generally « compensated » his wife, by way of gifts in the marriage contract, 
for her decision to forego the sharing that would have been brought about by 
the legal matrimonial regime51. The practice has often been criticized. A 
spouse who works in the home, having no proprietary stake in « family » 
income by virtue of her matrimonial regime, often received far less by way 
of gift than she would have as a share of one-half of her husband's salary as 
48. See Fifth Report of the Commissioners Charged with the Codification of the Laws of 
Lower Canada, Quebec City, George E. Desbarats, 1865, p. 201, where the abolition of 
the mutual donation of usufruct after marriage was proposed given that it was so rarely 
practised. 
49. Repealed by S.Q. 1969, c. 77. The full text read as follows : « If no covenants have been 
made, or if the contrary has not been stipulated, the consorts are presumed to subject 
themselves to the general laws and customs of the country, and particularly to the legal 
community of property, and to the customary or legal dower in favor of the wife and of 
the children to be born of the marriage. » In French, the expression in my italics read 
« aux lois et coutumes générales du pays ». 
50. Again, social historians have begun this work: see, e.g., H. DIONNE, Les contrats de 
mariage à Québec (1790-1812), Ottawa, National Museum of Canada, 1980. 
51. R. COMTOIS, op. cit., note 39, para. 369. This is an inference that one may draw from 
standard forms for marriage contracts published by and for the notarial profession : see, 
by way of example, P. CIOTOLA, «Les donations par contrat de mariage», in CHAMBRE 
DES NOTAIRES. Répertoire de droit: famille, Montreal, SOQUD, 1991, doc. 6. 
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acquest property52. But the sense that the marriage contract completes the 
matrimonial statut of spouses separate as to property by bringing a measure 
of sharing to the marriage is well-established for the period preceding the 
enactment of the family patrimony53. 
Practice here, if consecrated by customary law, reflects rules which are 
praeter legem, at least from the perspective of the few codai rules of 
separation of property. Research would have to be undertaken in the factors 
which bring about the variations in the content of marriage contracts of 
couples separate as to property in order to isolate practice as the material 
dimension of custom in a meaningful way. Moreover a parallel study of 
spouses subject to community of property regimes who nevertheless made 
marriage contracts would complete the picture, perhaps revealing signs of 
informal norms that reduce or alter the sharing established by the regime54. 
Again, there are suggestions in the literature that differing patterns of 
contractual practice reflect the rural-urban divide55, the social status of the 
couple56, the alimentary role the gifts may be called on to play given the 
relative ages and fortunes of the spouses, and more. This is a rich avenue for 
research but it seems plain that the idea that separation of property carries 
with it no legal basis for sharing is an oversimplification. 
Moreover, the content of the marriage contract is not only the result of 
spousal preference but also reflects the tenor of notarial practice. Notaries' 
standard forms, or their standard form advice, have no doubt been very 
52. For a criticism of the effect of such practice as a substitute for partnership of acquests 
in which notarial habit is identified as culprit, see J. PINEAU, loc. cit., note 9, 114 and 
118. 
53. As P. CIOTOLA, loc. cit., note 26, para. 96, wrote in 1976, «le contrat de manage doit 
assurer, par son contenu, un minimum de protection au foyer familial, notamment à 
l'épouse». 
54. This suggestion is made in a remarkable book by a French jurist writing before socio-
logical jurisprudence came to matrimonial law : C. SAUJOT, La pénétration des idées 
séparatistes dans les régimes communautaires, Paris, LGDJ, 1956, p. 45 s. (« la volonté 
individuelle et l'augmentation des propres »). 
55. Some of the richest historical literature has focussed on gifts made in notarial form 
generally : see G. BOUCHARD, « Les systèmes de transmission des avoirs familiaux et le 
cycle de la société rurale au Québec, du XVIIe au XXe siècles », Histoire sociale/Social 
History, vol. 16, 1983, p. 35 ; and S. DÉPATIE, «La transmission du patrimoine dans les 
terroirs en expansion: un exemple canadien au XVIIIe siècle», Revue d'histoire de 
l'Amérique française, vol. 44, 1990, p. 171. 
56. See A.M. STEWART and B. BRADBURY, «Marriage Contracts as a Source for Histo-
rians », in D. FYSON etat (eds.), Class, Gender and the Law in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Quebec: Sources and Perspectives, Montreal, Montreal Business History 
Group mimeo., 1993, p. 33. 
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influential in the choice of matrimonial regime and particulary on the content 
of Ûve. pacte de famille. When patterns of advice take shape and are followed, 
it is appropriate to think of the notary as having a hand in law-making57. 
Where notaries consistently advise clients to make gifts in the marriage 
contract, to take one example, or where the parfait notaire5* suggests that 
contracts establishing separation as to property be accompanied by a con-
ventional appointment of the spouse as heir, the sharing that results is as 
much a result of systematized practice as it is of freedom of contract or of 
willing59. In his brilliant study entitled Recherches sur le rôle de la formule 
notariale dans le droit positif, French jurist Jean-Louis Sourioux signalled 
the richness of matrimonial law as a means of understanding the relationship 
between notarial practice and emergent customary norms60. While notaries 
typically describe their own work in family law as facilitative rather than 
normative, the manner in which they speak of their sense of responsibility 
extending beyond the interests of the couple before them often betrays their 
own understanding of what a Belgian notary has described as « l'adaptation 
du droit patrimonial de la famille par la pratique notariale61 ». Quebec nota-
ries have advised innovative and even aggressive use of the marriage con-
tract to achieve not just desired effects for individual clients but with a sense 
that they play a role in directing social ordering in respect of matrimonial 
57. See R.A. MACDONALD, «Images du notariat, imagination du notaire», (1994) 1 C. 
P. duN. 1, para. 113-119 and 123-131, for a brilliant consideration of the « normative» 
role of these practitioners. For a rare self-conscious expression of this phenomenon by 
a notary working in matrimonial law, see M. LÉGARÉ, «Réflexions sur les régimes 
matrimoniaux », (1975) 77 R. du N. 575, 583. 
58. This term is used to designate books of standard forms for notaries. For an example of 
gift giving as standard-form advice, see S. BINETTE, «Le contrat de mariage depuis le 
nouveau Code civil du Québec», (1981) 1 C.P. du N. 107, para. 25, 31 and 37. 
59. See, e.g., notary F. COULOMBE'S defence of separation as to property, « De nos régimes 
matrimoniaux», (1921) 23 R. du N. 161, 165, on the basis that «[l]es notaires de la 
campagne savent que sur cent testaments [...] qu'ils reçoivent, quatre-vingt-dix-neuf, 
quelquefois cent, sont en « faveur du conjoint survivant » ». More recently, see R. COM-
TOIS, «Le rôle du praticien dans l'élaboration des règles de droit», (1974) 77 R. du N. 
151, 160, and, for a theoretical overview, see M. OUELLETTE, «Rapport canadien: le 
rôle de la pratique dans la formation du droit», in Travaux de l'Association Henri-
Capitant, t. XXXIV, Paris, Economica, 1985, 63, pp. 64-65, 72-73. 
60. See J.-L. SOURIOUX, Recherches sur le rôle de la formule notariale dans le droit positif, 
Paris, Lib. du journal des notaires et des avocats, 1967, para. 125, in which the author 
noted that the «droit des gens mariés de l'ancienne France [...] illustre particulièrement 
les relations entre la formule notariale et la règle coutumière ». 
61. M. GRÉGOIRE, « L'adaptation du droit patrimonial de la famille par la pratique notariale », 
in Famille, Droit et changement social dans les sociétés contemporaines : Travaux des 
VIIIe Journées Jean Dabin, Brussels, Bruylant, 1978, p. 296. A similar point is made for 
Quebec by J. AUGER, «Une formule pas comme les autres», (1974) 16 R. du N. 407,413. 
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property62, most recently from the perspective of « preventive law63 ». Re-
search should fix on notarial forms and notarial records as a means of 
teasing out evidence of the material basis of a custom for sharing in mar-
riage64. 
But it may be that the practice of sharing is invisible not only to the 
Civil Code, but also to the formal institutions associated most readily with 
the matrimonial statut, including the marriage contract. Do spouses share 
when the terms of both their matrimonial regime and their marriage contract 
do not require it ? Once more, the situation of spouses separate as to 
property provides a most useful testing ground : do they share and, if so, is 
this sharing a legal phenomenon ? Here again, the difficulties associated 
with documenting the practice become even more daunting. Yet even in the 
absence of sociological data, there is a nagging certainty among the closest 
observers of matrimonial law that the strictures of formal law cannot 
account for all of the spouses' behaviour in respect of their finances. French 
jurists have observed what has been called — positivistically — a de facto 
community of property practised during marriage by spouses who are 
separate as to property. «Une communauté de fait s'introduit presque 
toujours, entre eux », wrote René Savatier in respect of spouses separate as 
to property, «sous le couvert de leur régime65». Quebec experts have 
remarked upon the same phenomenon, and did so especially vigourously 
through the late 1960s as separation as to property was adopted as an 
alternative to the increasingly disfunctional legal regime of community of 
property66. John Brierley described the « paradox » of separation in that 
« spouses will, as a matter of fact, inevitably, to some degree tend to practise 
62. See, e.g., the proposals of notary A. ROY, «Les contrats de mariage innovateurs», 
unpubl. manuscript presented at the «Law and You Seminar», Montreal, Faculty of 
Law, McGill University, 31 March 1995. 
63. See A. ROY, « Les relations entre conjoints mariés ou unis de fait dans une perspective 
de droit préventif», unpubl. LL.M. thesis, Montreal, Université de Montréal, 1995, 
pp. 10-17, 41-47 and 105-107. 
64. Again social historians of law have blazed a small trail : see esp. J. LELIÈVRE, La pratique 
des contrats de mariage au Châtelet de Paris de 1769 à 1804, Paris, Éditions Cujas, 
1959. 
65. R. SAVATIER, «Sociologie et droit de la famille», in Droit, économie et sociologie: 
Travaux du Vlième colloque des Facultés de droit et des sciences économiques de 
Toulouse, Paris, Dalloz, 1959, p. 97. 
66. See, e.g., R. COMTOIS, «Pourquoi la société d'acquêts?», (1967) 27 /?. du B. 602, 611 ; 
and C. CHARRON, «La séparation de biens comme régime légal? Un essai de bilan», 
(1972) 74 R. du N. 307, 317, 319, 323, 326. 
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a modified form of community67 ». The reference is not to a mass of property 
held in indivision by reason of the choice of the spouses or as a consequence 
of an evidentiary rule where spouses find themselves disinclined to keep 
accounts68, but instead may be seen as the effect of a norm that stands 
outside the casings of enacted law. 
By adopting an understanding of law that encompasses informal 
expressions of normativity, the de facto community of spouses in separation 
must be entirely rethought. Indeed, the term used to describe the phenome-
non is a hopeless misnomer : this de facto community is eminently de jure, 
albeit a common mass of the lex non scripta. This practice of pooling 
resources, notwithstanding the invitation of the matrimonial regime to do 
otherwise, is the material dimension of a customary norm that brings sharing 
to marriage, even to those spouses who are separate as to property. Custom 
introduces a norm that is praeter legem in that it completes the patrimonial 
situation of the spouses as revealed by their matrimonial regime and their 
marriage contract. 
Here are some of the scattered signs that would suggest that the Civil 
Code cannot in itself account for the whole of the behaviour of the spouses 
in respect of their property. Indeed, the search for signs of informal law of 
family property, where confined to the resources of a law library, is likely to 
uncover nothing more reliable than scholarly hunches. « La coutume ne peut 
être que « gestuelle »69 », as a leading expert has written ; it thus most likely 
lives beyond the books, electronic or otherwise, that lawyers know best. 
And as long as law's literature remains preoccupied with accounts of the lex 
scripta, we are rather more likely to discover evidence of the material 
dimension of everyday law in other texts, surveys, songs, films and the like 
which depict family life in Quebec70. 
67. J.E.C. BRIERLEY, « Husband and Wife in the Law of Quebec : A 1970 Conspectus », in 
D. MENDES DA COSTA (ed.), Studies in Canadian Family Law, vol. II, Toronto, But-
terworths, 1972, 795, pp. 829-830. 
68. Undivided co-ownership may arise between the spouses as a consequence of the matri-
monial regime in two discrete instances : first, by presumption, where the spouses are 
unable to establish an exclusive right of ownership over property that is owned by one 
or another of them (art. 486 C.C.) ; and, second, where indivision arises by contract, 
succession, judgment or otherwise by operation of law between them (art. 485 C.C, 
when read with art. 1012 C.C). 
69. See J. VANDERLINDEN, «Contribution en forme de mascaret à une théorie des sources 
du droit au départ d'une source délicieuse», (1995) R.T.D.C. 69, 71 and 74. 
70. For one such sign, see « La ballade du renvoi (contrat de mariage) » : 
«Les époux sont séparés ... 
Suivant que le permet le code ... » 
— « Pardon, notaire, le curé 
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But even the law library contains enough evidence to suggest that there 
is an alternative to the conclusion so regularly arrived at that love and trust 
invite spouses to behave irrationally as legal actors ; or noting that some 
behaviour is best accounted for as a matter of « fact » rather than of « law » ; 
or still again that rogue conduct can be explained away on the strength of a 
fine distinctions between «law» and «morality» or «droit» and «non-
droit ». The kind of studies that seem obvious to social historians of family 
property71 must be undertaken more systematically by lawyers to upset this 
prejudice72. In advance of this work, it does seem possible that an alterna-
tive vision of the patrimonial relations between the spouses can be brought 
about by expanding the compass of matrimonial law beyond the usual texts 
and inquire whether there is, in what historian E.P. Thompson has called 
« ambience73 » of ordinary living, a normative phenomenon. It is when the 
practice of sharing is coupled with a sense, among those engaged therein, 
that they are obliged to do so that practice is transformed — by custom — 
from « fact » into « law ». 
1.2 Opinio juris Requiring Spouses to Share Family Property 
Custom is more than habit ; it is also a belief in the force of habit. It is 
not enough to ask whether spouses share property in marriage when the 
texts would suggest that they are free to do otherwise. One must examine 
whether they do so out of a sense of « conviction74 », consciously or uncon-
sciously, and locating this conviction outside of the black-letter universe is 
N'aime pas beaucoup cette mode ; 
Rien qu'un lit!» — «Hé! c'est un oubli ...» 
(Quel est le chat qui m'égratigne ?) 
From (notary) G. VALOIS, Minutes retrouvées, Montreal, Fides, 1953, p. 167. 
71. See, e.g., G. POSTOLEC, « La reproduction sociale à Neuville au XVIIIe siècle : l'apport 
foncier au mariage», in R. BONNAIN, G. BOUCHARD and J. ROY (eds.), Transmettre, 
hériter, succéder: la reproduction famlliale en milieu rural France-Québec, XVIIIe-
XXe siècle, Lyons, Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1992, p. 43, and, by a legal historian, 
J. VANDERLINDEN, «Contrats de mariage à Port-Royal au début du XVIIIe siècle», 
unpubl. manus., Moncton, Université de Moncton, 1995. 
72. This work has been begun elsewhere in Canada. See, for New Brunswick, D. POIRIER 
and L. CASTONGUAY, «Formal vs Real Equality in Property Division on Marriage 
Breakdown: An Empirical Study», (1994) 11 Can. Farn. Law Q. 71. 
73. E.P. THOMPSON, Customs in Common, New York, New Press, 1991, p. 3 and in chap. 3, 
passim. Thompson also used the term mentalité to the same end. 
74. J. CARBONNIER, Droit civil. Introduction, 17e éd.. Paris, PUF, 1988, para. 25, used this 
term in his account of custom. The psychological dimension of custom is explained in 
M. TROPER, «DU fondement de la coutume à la coutume comme fondement», (1986) 3 
Droits 11. 
814 Les Cahiers de Droit (1995) 36 C. de D. 795 
the task of the jurist who seeks to document everyday law. This phenom-
enon is generally described as the psychological component of custom— 
what Jean Carbonnier has depicted as the « sentiment de l'obligatoire » in his 
work on the emergence of customary law75. The inquiry as to the existence 
of opinio juris also provides the principal opportunity for denying the oblig-
atory character of custom for sceptics of the theory of informal law. Often 
it is argued that the belief in law is simply not present. More often still, 
behaviour is characterized as rooted in a belief in something less « binding » 
than law, styled variously as morality, goodness, charity, social convention, 
usage, mere fact and the like76. Again the rules of positive law relating to 
separation of property pose the most formidable challenge to the customary 
lawyer. A husband and wife who are entitled to individual enjoyment and 
free disposal of all their property at least if we take the Civil Code at its 
worcl may decide to pool their resources anyway. But do they do so 
because they sense they have no choice in the matter ? 
In the family property's great tradition of legal positivism, lawyers have 
been dismissive of this kind practice as more sentimental than juridical. Yet 
the spouses' belief that they really must share property may be as much a 
matter of law as it is a matter of soft-heartedness. In fact, duties « imposed » 
by the heart and by the law may coincide completely in the theory of 
informal sources of matrimonial property. Certain cultural attitudes to mar-
ried life may not simply encourage spouses to share property as a happy way 
to express how they feel about one another, but also provide them with a 
sense that they must do so as a matter of legal obligation. 
A belief in law not consecrated by text is, at the best of times, difficult 
to discern for the outsider not under its sway. It is of course a feeling — Car-
bonnier's word sentiment11 is especially right for custom in the family 
setting — something alive in the head and heart of the spouses obliged. And 
since the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man, the work of the legal 
75. See J. CARBONNIER, «La genèse de l'obligation dans l'apparition de la coutume», in 
Flexible droit, 5e éd., Paris, LGDJ, 1983, p. 99. The Latin maxim opinio juris seit 
necessitatis is generally encountered in the classical literature: H. ROLAND and 
L. BOYER, Expressions latines du droit français, 2nd ed., Lyons, L'Hermès, 1985, p. 330. 
76. The classical exposition of the parameters of the debate are sketched by H.L.A. HART, 
« Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals », (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, and 
L. FULLER, «Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Response to Professor Hart », (1958) 
71 Harv. L. Rev. 630. For paper anticipating the Fuller thesis which draws on Civil law 
sources for family property, see M. RHEINSTEIN, «What Should be the Relations of 
Morals to Law ?», (1952) 1 J. Pub. L. 287. 
77. He further elucidated the notion of the « sentiment de la règle» in J. CARBONNIER « Sur 
le caractère primitif de la règle de droit», in Mélanges en l'honneur de Paul Roubier, 
t. 1, Paris, Dalloz et Sirey, 1961, pp. 116-121. 
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sociologist of documenting these feelings is especially difficult. No doubt 
this problem is more acutely felt in family matters, notably family finances, 
where values of privacy set up a great barrier to useful inquiry. Ironically, 
the lex non scripta of the family is obscured by the very love and trust that 
promote the sharing of property between spouses in the first place. 
But above all things, the most formidable hurdle before the jurist 
seeking out signs of obligation that stands beyond the reach of the legisla-
ture is a lawyers' disease. Decried by champions of custom as a plague on 
the modern Civil law78 and common law79 houses, legal positivism seems to 
bring about, as its principal symptom, a measure of blindness to unwritten 
feelings about what law is80. The exalted status of the written word in the 
French Civil law tradition—the prestige du droit écrit, as it is sometimes 
styled — apparently legitimizes the first-order place that positivism reser-
ves for text in the lawyers' world of ideas81. Indeed, civilian or not, today's 
lawyers are the natural allies of lex scripta and, as if by conspiracy in 
support of the economic value of their monopoly on legal services, they 
discount the people's law as a matter of professional ethic. State-sponsored 
positivism dominates the world view of those of us charged with documen-
ting the sources of the law of family property and, not surprisingly, those of 
us who make a living reading the law in books find that «la coutume blesse 
notre vanité82». 
This predilection for formal law among lawyers notwithstanding, there 
is a nagging sense among experts in family law that a mysterious force in 
marriage obliges spouses to pool their resources. This force may reside in 
husbands' and wives' own understanding of their shared life as a legal idea. 
If the spouses' appreciation of the essence of their relationship is that in 
order to sustain the community of interests that marriage incarnates, they 
must contribute to one another's well being, this contribution may result in 
a conviction that the pursuit of their common life requires them to share 
property. This sentimental thought is conveyed in the language of the 
78. J. CARBONNIER, op. cit., note 74, para. 136, wrote of «le culte du texte de loi et de la 
légalité» as a driving force in the theory of sources of French law. 
79. L. FULLER, loc. cit., note 76,660, denounced the lawyers' preoccupation with the « tinsel 
of legal form » as inhibiting a full understanding of law. 
80. One expert in the theory of everyday law recently pointed out that legal education is 
often responsible for not developing jurists «capacity to observe» : W.O. W E Y R A U C H , 
« Book Reviews : Legal Anthropology », (1994) 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 807. 
81. For an example of this aspect of conventional civilian doctrine in a classical exposition, 
see G. RIPERT, Le déclin du droit, Paris, LGDJ, 1949, pp. 99 s, where a particular distaste 
for custom in conflict with enacted law is detailed. 
82. E. LAMBERT, DU contrat en faveur du tiers: droit coutumier contemporain, Paris, Girard 
& Brière, 1893, p. vii. 
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French Civil law tradition as the obligation défaire vie commune, generally 
regarded as an imperative effect of marriage. The obligation to establish a 
« shared life » is sometimes awkwardly rendered in English civilian parlance 
as an « obligation to live together », as in art. 392 C.C., but it is, of course, at 
once more and less than mere cohabitation83. As spouses who take marriage 
seriously no doubt understand better than their lawyers, the obligation of vie 
commune is part of the unspoken affective core of their relationship and, as 
a result, almost defies (wordy) definition. It is the consecration of the 
personal, physical, emotional, metaphysical—and financial — union of 
marriage84, but not surprisingly judges and others, forgetting if necessary 
their own life experiences, typically reduce it to the banality of cohabitation. 
Very recently, the Civil Code has decided to evoke it, bashfully, along with 
the equally ephemeral duties of « succour and assistance », « fidelity » and 
« respect » that are said to characterize all marriages85. Yet however difficult 
to define, these obligations may sustain the opinio juris for customary norms 
for family property. 
Whatever the content of these duties beyond the expression of an 
aspiration, it is undoubted that consortium and the rest bring a sense that 
marriage necessarily imports some blending of patrimonial interests. The 
language traditionally used by scholars to give juridical colour to the finan-
cial dimension of vie commune is telling in this regard : for Pothier, it was the 
basis for community of property86 ; for Batiffol, « la communauté de vie 
entraîne inévitablement une communauté—au sens générique—de biens et 
des intérêts87 » ; Louis Baudouin said that married life triggers automatically 
«un certain mécanisme d'ordre pécunaire auquel les époux se trouvent 
83. While spouses who live up to the obligation de faire vie commune generally do live 
under the same roof, courts have occasionally noted that this is not the essence of the 
duty : see, e.g., Dame Trudeau v. Ouellette, [1972] C.S. 699. 
84. See the proposed definition in P.-A. CRÉPEAU (ed.), et Dictionnaire de droit privé and 
the Private Law Dictionary, 3rd editions, Montreal, in preparation at the Quebec Re-
search Centre of Private and Comparative Law, McGill University. The editors have, 
neologistically at least for the Civil Law, proposed the word «consortium» as the 
English-language equivalent of vie commune. 
85. First added to the codai exposition of family law by S.Q. 1980, c. 39, this idea was 
accepted as a doctrinal reality long before : see, e.g., R.H.E. WALKER, « The Disintegra-
ting Marriage», in W.C.J. Meredith Lectures : Family Law, Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 
1965, 8 at 11 (styled «common life»). 
86. POTHIER, Traité de droit civil, vol. 3, [1781], 497, cited with approval in Sura v. M.N.R., 
[1960] Ex. C.R. 83 at 87. 
87. H. BATIFFOL, « Existence et spécificité du droit de la famille», (1975) 20 Arch.phll. dr. 7, 
10-11. The expression « communauté de vie » is current in French law to explain a legal 
idea similar to vie commune in the Civil Code of Québec. 
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soumis en fait88 ». Accounting for the content of consortium is something 
that lawyers have traditionally shied away from, but even the Civil Code 
hints that it plays a more significant role in describing marriage as a rela-
tionship that shapes property rights than would a mere obligation to live 
together. It can be invoked, for example, as the date at which the court fixes 
the effects of the dissolution of the partnership of acquests89 or for the 
purposes of the date at which the net value of the family patrimony is to be 
calculated90. In each case, the legislature suggests that it is the existence of 
the vie commune to which marriage as a joint economic venture is allied. 
One further way in which to gauge the impact of the obligation to 
pursue a common life upon the informal law of marriage is from the outside. 
As consortium is often said to be a property of both marriages and de facto 
marriages, one might expect to see signs of the juridical context of the 
common life fleshed out in the family property law of unmarried couples91. 
Scholars have often pointed to how so-called de facto unions can be instruc-
tive for the purpose of understanding marriage92 and this is especially true 
in respect of the informal law of matrimonial property given that the civil 
codes have left this aspect of cohabitation wholly in the hands of unwritten 
law93. Often characterized as proceeding on a financial footing similar to the 
matrimonial regime of separation as to property, the de facto union is, like 
those marriages, subject to intense regulation despite the apparent absence 
of rules. Judges' sure sense, sometimes awkwardly expressed, that cohab-
itees are wrapped up in a joint economic venture is a palpable acknowl-
edgment that legislative text often fails to explain the finances of love 
relationships94. There are, most assuredly, unseen rules inherent in the de 
88. J.-L. BAUDOUIN «À propos de la réforme des régimes matrimoniaux en droit québé-
cois», (1969) 71 R. du N. 279, 279. Could Professor Baudouin's reference to the sharing 
that exists «en fait» be seen as one that existed based on informal law? 
89. Art. 466C.C. 
90. Art. 417, para. 2 C.C. 
91. Legislative texts outside the civil codes speak more boldly to the obligation to share 
property in de facto unions, typically fixing on living «as husband and wife» («vivant 
maritalement»). See, e.g., An Act respecting income security, R.S.Q. c. S-3.1.1, s. 2. 
92. See P. MALAURIE, « Mariage et concubinage en droit français contemporain », (1975) 20 
Arch.phil. dr. 17,27-28. 
93. A tip of this iceberg is to be gleaned from contractual and testamentary practices of de 
facto spouses. See, in respect of the former, J. SYLVESTRE, « Les accords entre concu-
bins»,(1981) 1 C.P.duN. 195. 
94. Courts have generally relied in Quebec on devices from the law of obligations (such as 
unjust enrichment in Droit de la famille—359, [1987] R.D.F. 156 (Sup. Ct.)), or commer-
cial law (such as undeclared partnership in Beaudoin-Daignault v. Richard, [1984] 
1 S.C.R. 2) for the juridical basis upon which sharing might be imposed. 
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facto union95 which, like in marriage, reflect a sense that sharing is required 
by the shared life which drives the partnership. 
Whether understood through the various hints given in the Civil Code 
and statutory law or the sparse literature treating consortium for unmarried 
persons, the notion of vie commune seems to carry with it an important 
patrimonial dimension. Insofar as the legislature has decided to leave this 
aspect of married life to the spouses' imagination, it may well be that their 
imagination has filled the gap with law. The conviction that both married and 
unmarried couples have that they must create a fund of family property to 
sustain their relationship materially quite likely has its locus in this imagined 
sense of what is at the core of this marriage. Others have remarked on the 
evanescent character of the legal idea of consortium96, and it may be that 
informal law is best suited to expressing the binding character of this aspect 
of the law of family property97. At the very least the legislature, which took 
it upon itself to give shape to this patrimonial side of the « common life » in 
1989 with the enactment of the family patrimony, should be recognized for 
having given written shape to a Cheyenne way. 
2. Custom Revealed in the Family Patrimony 
Do articles 414 to 427 C.C. merely codify existing custom in respect of 
family property in marriage ? If it is indeed true, as Otto Kahn-Freund wrote 
in 1953, that married life generates a « family fund between husband and wife 
that is ignored by legislation98 », the enactment of the family patrimony in 
1989 might well be seen as the text that fills that void. And if the family 
patrimony has carried forward into the realm of state-made law existing 
informal norms for sharing property in marriage, it should be seen as super-
95. This is evidenced by the development of the constructive trust as a remedy for unjust 
enrichment, in relationships tantamount to spousal, in Canada's «other» legal tradition. 
See, e.g., Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980. 
96. G. BRIÈRE, « Réflexions à l'occasion d'une réforme », (1970) 73 R. du N. 55,56, expressed 
this very well : «Ce n'est pas le mariage qui rend le droit commun inapte à régler les 
problèmes pécuniaires des époux, c'est leur vie commune. » 
97. The inadequacy of formal law in this regard was explained recently by French notary 
J. CHARLIN, « Introduction », in Couples et modernité: gestion et transmission du pa-
trimoine (84ième Congrès des notaires de France), Paris, Litec, 1988, p. 13, in the 
following terms : « la loi ne sera jamais adaptée dans le détail aux besoins des personnes 
vivant en couple». 
98. O. KAHN-FREUND, « Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife », 
(1953) 16 Mod. L. Rev. 34,48. This family fund, observed by Kahn-Freund to be a « living 
reality », was alluded to in the context of a review of anglo-american and civilian sources 
of matrimonial property law. 
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imposed upon existing rules and thus as an enactment «secunuum cus-
tom». On the other hand, if the family patrimony and informal law do not 
coincide, the new rules (or the old custom) may be viewed as completing or 
in conflict with the other normative form. The provisions of the Code should 
therefore be measured against the informal law of family property to deter-
mine to what extent the new basis in enacted law for treating marriage as a 
joint economic endeavour is, in fact, new law (2.1). Deciding whether the 
family patrimony piggy-backs onto a patrimoine familial that was already 
flourishing within the Quebec legal order as a matter of customary law poses 
the essential question of the law of family patrimony during marriage. Why 
do spouses share property (2.2) ? 
2.1 New Basis in Enacted Law for Treating Marriage 
as a Joint Economic Endeavour 
There is little direct evidence that the rules adopted in 1989 constitute 
what legal anthropologists have called an « incorporating n o r m " » whereby 
the state brings into formal law part or all of an existing custom100. On the 
contrary, the legislature congratulated itself on enacting the family patri-
mony as a juridical invention, touting it as new law that would impose a 
partnership on all marriages in order to promote economic equality101. At 
one level this is no doubt t rue—as a public order injunction for married 
people to share the value of assets not held by them jointly in actual or 
deferred indivision, it is certainly quite unlike the positive law in force in 
1989. While then existing mandatory rules also sought to underscore the 
nature of marriage as a joint economic endeavour, they did not in principle 
impose the sharing of property on spouses against their wishes. True, the 
provisions dealing with family residence have effectively required the 
spouses to share the enjoyment of the matrimonial home and its contents 
during marriage, but the rules do so by regulating administration as opposed 
99. On « incorporating norms » with particular reference to aboriginal custom in Canada, 
see B.W. MORSE and G.R. WOODMAN, « Introductory Essay : The State's Options», in 
B.W. MORSE and G.R. WOODMAN (eds.), Indigenous Law and the State, Providence, 
R.I., Foris Publ., 1988, p. 11. 
100. See, however, the «Explanatory Notes» to QUEBEC, Bill 146. First Reading, Quebec 
City, Éditeur officiel, 1989, enacted as S.Q., 1989, c. 55, where the object of the legislation 
establishing the family patrimony is described as follows : « to underline the character 
of marriage as a partnership». The choice of the word «underline» (in French, «de 
marquer») suggests the recognition of an existing a proprietary interest rather than the 
creation of a new one out of whole legislative cloth. 
101. See ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, Journal des débats (8 June 1989) pp. 6486-6487 (per Hon. 
M. GAGNON-TREMBLAY). 
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to title to such property102. The compensatory allowance has provided a 
public order remedy for unjust enrichment during marriage since 1980, but 
there sharing does not proceed as a matter of right but depends on a proven 
and unrequited contribution103. 
None of this equivocation bedevils the family patrimony. These new 
rules at arts 414 to 426 treat marriage as a partnership in respect of the net 
value of certain property closely associated with the marriage when contem-
plated as a shared economic life. This is true for all marriages whether or not 
they are coloured by unjust enrichment and notwithstanding the effect of the 
matrimonial regime, or of the law of property generally, on the spouses' 
respective fortunes104. In this sense, the principles embodying the family 
patrimony do seem very new. By including it as part of a matrimonial public 
order, the legislature announced that the new institution which imposes 
sharing in value of certain family property stands outside tradition as there-
tofore understood by positive law. 
But the idea that sharing property is an inherent feature of marriage is 
not, of course, new at all. The family patrimony draws on the same values 
of commonality that have always sustained the shared-property matrimo-
nial regimes of the civil codes105. The cardinal ethic of the family patrimony 
is akin to that of community of property and partnership of acquests : 
certain rights and obligations, when allied with the marriage as a joint eco-
nomic endeavour, are presumed to be « acquest » property, in the broadest 
sense of that term. The family patrimony should thus be shared, like the 
masses of acquest property in the shared-property regimes, given its notio-
nal status as family or, more precisely, marital property. Certainly in par-
liamentary commission, many experts argued that the proposed law should 
recognize the family character of certain property in the way that the 
spouses themselves did, both in respect of property to be included106 and 
102. See arts 400-413 C.C., enacted in substantially the same terms by S.Q. 1980, c. 39. 
Exceptionally, a court can make an order affecting title to the family residence and its 
contents at the end of marriage. 
103. See art. 427 C.C. Moreover, the Code gives the remedy an uncertain place as against the 
so-called secondary regimes, which establish the manner and extent to which spouses 
share property, since the allowance is to be fixed « taking into account, in particular, the 
advantages of the matrimonial regime and the marriage contract ». 
104. See arts 391 and 431 C.C, subject to the special remedy at art. 422. 
105. These connections are canvassed in D. BURMAN and J. PINEAU, op. cit., note 18, 
para. 2. 
106. See, e.g., P. ISSALYS, «Observations présentées à la Commission des institutions de 
l'Assemblée nationale sur le document intitulé «Les droits économiques des con-
joints » », unpubl., Quebec City, 1988, pp. 14-17, who argued forcefully (and successfully) 
in favour of the inclusion of certain pension rights in the family patrimony on this basis. 
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excluded107 in the then mooted family patrimony. Acquest property has 
changed its meaning over time108 but has always embodied a same reality : 
certain property should be shared — at least in value—based on a pre-
sumption that its acquisition results from the joint efforts of the partners 
in marriage. Unlike the compensatory allowance, for which contribution 
by a non-owner spouse must be established, articles 414 et seq. fix only on 
origin and the timing of acquisition of value, as is traditionally the case for 
acquest property. The designated property is excluded only where, by 
reason of provenance, it cannot be allied with the partnership ; otherwise 
its net value is included in the mass to be divided as long as it was acquired 
during the shared life which characterizes marriage109. By treating the as-
sets in the family patrimony, at least in terms of value, as acquest property 
at the end of marriage, the family patrimony draws on the communitarian 
spirit said to be a time-honoured animating feature of Quebec matrimonial 
law. 
Therein lies the paradox of the family patrimony as against tradition. 
While its mandatory character suggests it is a new legislative idea, the 
communitarian ethic at its core is by no means an invention for Quebec 
matrimonial law. The stand-off of new and old tends to fade away, however, 
as one expands the compass of matrimonial law beyond its usually acknowl-
edged sources to include the informal law of family property. The net value 
of the family patrimony susceptible of partition should not merely be allied 
with the concept of acquest property as spoken to by the shared-property 
regimes of the Civil Codes, but also to the legal idea of acquests that 
transcends the usual rules, finding expression in spousal practice and their 
own sense of obligation. 
We have seen that informal law embodies, like the family patrimony, a 
similar idea of marriage as a joint economic endeavour. Both custom and 
enactment justify, in the minds of the spouses who contemplate their mar-
riage as an economic partnership, the sharing of property generated by their 
combined efforts notwithstanding their chosen matrimonial regime. The 
107. See, e.g., M. CASTELLI, «Mémoire sur les droits économiques des conjoints présenté à 
la Commission des institutions», unpubl., Quebec City, 1988, p. 3, who argued that 
successional property was rightly excluded from division since it was not a «bien 
familial ». 
108. See J.E.C. BRIERLEY and R.A. M ACDONALD (eds.), Quebec Civil Law : An Introduction 
to Quebec Private Law, Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 1993, para. 316, 
where the transition of « acquests » from the ancien droit to the partnership of acquests 
is sketched. 
109. See the rules of calculation at arts 414-418 C.C. Thus, for example, successional property 
is excluded. 
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interesting feature that informal law shares with the family patrimony, as 
opposed to the matrimonial property rules set out elsewhere in the codes, is 
that couples do not opt in or opt out of the common mass by a visit to the 
notary. While informal law does not dictate the sharing of property in all 
marriages by necessity, it does seem to establish a mass of acquest property 
spontaneously as a result of the economic partnership inherent in a certain 
conception of consortium. In this sense, the communitarian values inherent 
in the family patrimony bears comparison with a parallel customary norm 
for sharing property in marriage. Thus by consecrating a modified concept 
of acquest property, the new rules echo both existing formal and informal 
regimes for the pooling of family assets by wife and husband. 
Indeed the new legislative texts themselves, no doubt unwittingly, seem 
to hint at the alliance between the family patrimony and the patrimoine 
familial of everyday law. In fact the Civil Code's apparently novel device 
for a joint economic venture that brings sharing to all marriages, not-
withstanding the effect of formal law on title to property, is cast in legislative 
language that sounds like a veritable definition of a family fund established 
by customary law : « Marriage entails the establishment of a family patrimo-
ny consisting of certain property of the spouses regardless of which of them 
holds a right of ownership in that property110. » Is the family patrimony, new 
as it is to positive law, a genuine juridical invention or merely the consecra-
tion of informal law's existing patrimoine familial ? 
The turn of legislative phrase at article 414 is indeed an unusual one. It 
confirms that the legislature itself understood family patrimony to be at odds 
with positive law, and at the very least the texts confirm that the family 
patrimony serves as an antidote to the law in the books at the time of its 
enactment. Not only is the family patrimony a new legislative basis for 
sharing, it also purports to be corrective of misfortunes brought about by 
application of the ordinary rules of matrimonial law. The manner used to 
describe its intended scope — « certain property of the spouses regardless of 
which of them holds a right of ownership in that property » — can be seen as 
an injunction to recognize the familial character of certain property where 
enacted law does not. This, as we have seen, has been one of the functions 
of informal family property law. Indeed part of the message of articles 414 
to 426, like that customary law, is that legislated law has gone awry — the 
vocation of the property in the mass is connected to marriage as a partner-
ship, notwithstanding the manner in which formal title to the property is 
110. Art. 414C.C. 
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treated by the general law of property and by the spouses' matrimonial 
regime111. 
Does this mean that the new rules simply bring into the books a family 
fund heretofore extant in everyday law ? If that were the case, one might 
have expected the new institution to establish a fund of family property on 
an on-going basis through the marriage rather than simply « in the event of 
separation from bed and board, or the dissolution or nullity of marriage », 
as art. 416 provides. Until now, we have assumed that if there is a family 
fund created by everyday law in which both spouses have an equal share, 
its establishment is not triggered by death or divorce but by the creation of 
the affective partnership itself. If marriage is a joint economic endeavour 
that justifies the pooling of certain assets in customary law, this sharing 
proceeds from the first day of the economic union, not from the last. The 
communauté défait, or communauté taisible or communauté coutumière 
— whatever one may choose to call this fund that is invisible to enacted 
law — must be a fund that the spouses create in order to run the marriage 
rather more than a pot established retrospectively to deal with the misfor-
tune of break-up or death, like the Civil Code's family patrimony. 
At first blush, then, the new institution seems to take shape at arm's 
length from any existing mass of family property arising as a matter of 
customary law. Despite the ambiguous language of art. 414 which suggests 
that « marriage », as opposed to marriage's end, entails the « establishment » 
of the fund, it is only at the financial equivalent of death or divorce that art. 
416 provides that the spouses can share the net value of the mass of 
designated assets112. Before that time, conventional wisdom has it that 
neither spouse has a right in rem in property held by the other, nor do either 
of them have a perfected personal right as creditor of their partner prior 
to the end of marriage113. Only at the end of the partnership does the 
non-owner spouse become the titulary of a right, and then it is a mere claim ; 
even though the court has the power to order «partition» by way of 
giving-in-payment, the transfer of property is viewed as attributive rather 
111. This reading finds confirmation in the document proposing the family patrimony, pre-
sented for public consultation by the Ministers of Justice and for the Status of Women : 
H. MARX and M. GAGNON-TREMBLAY, «Les droits économiques des conjoints», 
unpubl., Sainte-Foy, Ministère de la Justice, 1988, pp. 9-10 and 16. 
112. Nullity of marriage and separation as to bed and board are treated as triggering events 
in art. 416 C.C. on the unspoken theory that, like death and divorce, they represent an 
end to marriage as a partnership. 
113. See Droit de la famille —977, [1991] R.J.Q. 904, 909-910 (C.A.) (Baudouin J.). 
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than declaratory of ownership114. In this sense the family patrimony seems 
very unlike a patrimoine familial establlshed by informal law which would 
give each spouse some kind of proprietary stake in its value as the property 
was acquired in pursuit of marriage as an on-going partnership. This would 
suggest that the family patrimony takes shape not only at odds with existing 
positive law of matrimonial property, but also at arm's length from custom. 
But is it true that spouses have no proprietary claim — be it a principal 
or accessory real right, a personal right, or some variation on these cate-
gories — in the family patrimony prior to the triggering event ? Upon closer 
examination, the texts in question come far closer to acknowledging some 
sort of «actual» interest in the designated property before the family 
partnership dissolves. In addition to the suggestion, at art. 414, that the mass 
is « established » at the outset of marriage, the technical make-up of the 
family patrimony seems to confirm the popular belief that an interest in 
family property does not turn on individual title. The rules for the calculation 
of the net value of the mass operate on a modified basis. Thus, article 415 
includes the value of pension plan earnings amassed « during the marriage » ; 
articles 417 and 418 fix on the value of property associated with the period 
between the beginning of the marriage and the designated end of the joint 
economic venture when the mass is evaluated for partition ; and, impor-
tantly, article 417, para. 2 allows either spouse to petition the court to 
establish the value of the family property on the date the spouses ceased 
« living together115 ». These are, of course, mere rules of accounting, unlike 
their historical cousins in the law of community of property where spouses' 
undivided rights in the common mass rose and fell as the marriage flourished 
or floundered '16. But while the rules for calculation of the share in the family 
patrimony do not in themselves create any recognizable patrimonial right 
for the spouses during the marriage they do seem to acknowledge the reality 
that the claim takes shape as a gradual process shadowing a popular belief 
in the on-going process of amassing a shared fund of family property 
More difficult to explain, for those who contend that the non-owner 
spouse has no rights relating to the family patrimony before the end of 
114. Ibid, at 910 where the Court of Appeal gave this interpretation to art. 462.6 C.C.Q. (now 
art. 419, para. 2 C.C.). See, generally, M. DUCHESNE, «Les créanciers, le patrimoine 
familial et les autres dispositions du projet de loi 146», in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION 
PERMANENTE, BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, Le partage du patrimoine familial et ses consé-
quences juridiques (1990), Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Biais, 1990, p. 3-77 
115. The French version refers to the «date où les époux ont cessé de faire vie commune» 
which may or may not coincide with the end of cohabitation stricto sensu. 
116. See former arts 1272C.C.L.C. et seq. as interpreted in Sura v.M.N.R., [1962] S.C.R. 65, 
71-72. 
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marriage, is the remedy set forth at art. 421. Where property in the family 
patrimony has been alienated or misappropriated in the year preceding the 
end of the marriage as a joint economic endeavour, the court may order a 
compensatory payment to the non-owner spouse. On what possible basis 
can the non-owner make this claim ? If it is in fact correct that he or she has 
no real right in the property prior to the event which provokes partition, then 
the owner spouse has merely dealt with property over which he or she had 
full powers of abusus, subject only to the underlying matrimonial regime. 
Yet even though the non-owner has no actual right in or in relation to that 
property — at least no real or personal right as those ideas are convention-
ally understood—a remedy is provided at art. 421. This reality may not be 
a real or personal right as conventionally understood but it is nonetheless a 
proprietary interest. Not unlike the actual right of the substitute in property 
owned by the institute in the law of substitutions117, greater than the expec-
tancy of the heir prior to the opening of the succession118, here the Code 
seems to be alluding to a new species of matrimonial property. And this 
novelty may not be the only example in the provisions dealing with the 
family property where law's texts may have been stretched out of shape to 
accommodate an idea of informal law119. Could it be that the Code is 
acknowledging the reality understood by everyday law that the spouses in 
fact both have a stake in family property during the marriage ? 
If one takes law reformers at their word, there is little direct evidence 
that the addition of arts 414 et seq. amounts to a codification of customary 
law. But in a sense this is not surprising—most law reformers are state 
agents of some description, specializing in the made-law variety of law 
making. Their parlance is by virtual necessity benthamite whereby social 
ordering is best achieved by way of legislative enactment ; it reflects, in the 
final analysis, a conception of law according to which what has been 
117. While the institute is the « owner » of the substituted property before the opening of the 
substitution (art. 1233 C.C.), the substitute has an «eventual right» in the property 
substituted, which, at least on a reading of art. 1235 C.C., appears to be an actual right 
in his or her patrimony and not a mere expectation. 
118. The combined effect of the principles of revocability of wills and freedom of willing 
means that a prospective heir (whether testate or intestate) has no actual right in property 
of the « succession » prior to the death of a person but rather a mere expectation. (While 
not a present real or personal right, the expectation may yet have some status as property 
in informal law if freedom of willing is limited by custom, notwithstanding the apparent 
absolute character of arts 703 to 706 C.C.) 
119. As it may be the case, for example, where a spouse makes a successful claim under 
art. 422 C.C. where the owner spouse merely dealt with property during marriage as 
positive law would allow. A similar ambiguity arises where the court alters the valuation 
of the net value of the family property pursuant to art. 417, para. 2. 
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described here as « custom » or « informal law » is characterized as falling 
outside the state-driven legal universe, into a non-law realm of « usages », 
« sentiments », « attitudes » or, most often, « morals ». Yet if one reviews the 
history of matrimonial law reform with a view to correcting for the linguistic 
biases of state positivism, «les mœurs» — which law reformers always 
claim to take into account—might be thought of a code-word for everyday 
law120. 
One possible explanation of the failure of the family patrimony to rally 
support—beyond the explanation that the ideological distaste for interven-
tionism in family finance provides — is the failure, when the new rules were 
first designed, to connect it with prevailing attitudes to family property 
sitting outside the bounds of enacted law. While the legislature did engage in 
active solicitation of opinions in respect of the original proposal as deposited 
in parliamentary commission, there is no evidence of comprehensive socio-
logical study that might have shaped a legislative device more in step with 
prevailing morality — and the prevailing state of everyday law121. Enthu-
siasts of customary law have always held firm to the view that sociological 
study is a necessary feature of law reform. Henri Lévy-Bruhl argued in the 
1940s that this was essential to good law-making122 ; Lon Fuller promoted an 
understanding of customary law as a prerequisite to an understanding of 
made law123 ; and this approach has had special favour in family property 
law, notably in France124 but also elsewhere125, from the 1950s. Importantly, 
Jean Carbonnier wrote of the importance of a « consensus sociologique » in 
advance of matrimonial law reform, and brought that message with great 
120. See, generally, J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, « L a femme mariée et le Code civil du 
Bas Canada : une commune émancipation ?» , in H.P. G L E N N (ed.), Droit québécoss et 
droit français : communauté, autonomie, concordance, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon 
Biais, 1993, p. 227 and passim. 
121. There are, however, references to the numbers of spouses in separation of property cited 
in the original proposal for the family patrimony : see H. MARX and M. GAGNON-TREM-
BLAY, op. cit., note 111, p. 9. 
122. As a means, said H. L É V Y - B R U H L , «Variétés : une enquête sur la pratique juridique en 
France», (1946) 44 R.T.D.C. 298, of drawing attention to «la révolte des faits sur le 
Code». 
123. L. F U L L E R , loc. cit., note 17, 213. 
124. See, generally, F. TERRÉ, « L a méthode sociologique en droit comparé», in Etudes de 
droit contemporain (nouvelle série), Paris, Éditions de l'Épargne, 1970, p. 46, and, with 
special reference to the French reform of 1965, L. SÉBAG, « L a méthode quantitative en 
droit civil et la réforme des régimes matrimoniaux», D.1963.Chr.23.203. 
125. The school of «sociological jurisprudence», often associated with continental Europe, 
had an influence in the English reform of the law of intestate successions from the 1950s. 
See J.G. M I L L E R , The Machinery of Succession, Abingdon, Professional Books, 1977, 
p. 92. 
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effect to Quebec on the eve of the enactment of the partnership of ac-
quests126. 
And yet while, for a time, the sociological school seemed to be in the 
ascendant in Quebec law reform circles, it did not have a prominent part in 
the 1989 law reform process. Certainly there was historical precedent for 
taking the pulse of people's law before proceeding with reform. Even in the 
most conservative circles in the past, sociological arguments were advanced 
in support—and in horror—of law reform, occasionally cast in the lan-
guage of informal law127. It was, after all, the sudden realization that « law » 
was out of step with social practice that finally prompted a rethinking of 
community of property128. Moreover, with the workings of the Civil Code 
Revision Office, this interest in social practice formalized for a time, com-
peting with comparative law methodology as the most scientific manner of 
modernizing law129. 
Is it possible that the legislature overstepped its province and, as a 
result, enacted a family patrimony so out of step with the popular under-
standing of the patrimoine familial that it runs the risk of failing to generate 
consensus ? Arguments were raised, in discussions preceding the enactment 
of the new rules, that the family patrimony was too far removed from family 
needs, expectations and practices to make good law. Most opposition to the 
proposal in parliamentary commission fixed upon its mandatory character 
and one way to understand this objection is that an unbending rule, for all 
of Quebec spouses, would be insufficiently sensitive to established patterns 
for sharing that varied across the province. Quebec is not, of course, a 
126. See his lesson before a Quebec audience in J. CARBONNIER, « Quelques remarques sur 
l'esprit de la loi française du 13 juillet 1965 portant réforme des régimes matrimoniaux », 
(1968) 14 McGlll L.J. 590, 593 and 595-596, as well as J. CARBONNIER, « U n essai de 
statistique de la répartition des régimes matrimoniaux conventionnels à la veille de la 
réforme de 1965», Année sociologiqu,, 1964, p. 443. 
127. See, e.g., COMMISSION DES DROITS CIVILS DE LA FEMME, «Droits civils de la femme, 
Premier rapport des commissaires», (1930) 32 R. du N. 230, 231-232, where law reform-
ers, in support of their traditionalist posture, stated that enacted law is « la sanction par 
le législateur d'une habitude de penser, de sentir, d'agir qui s'est généralisée et qui est 
devenue une coutume ». 
128. See P.-A. CRÉPEAU, « Les principes fondamentaux de la réforme des régimes matrimo-
niaux», in Lois nouvelles II, Montreal, PUM, 1970, p. 13. Then president of the Civil 
Code Revision Office, Crépeau cited a well-known survey conducted by notary Roger 
Comtois, which revealed that upwards of 70% of spouses chose separation of property 
over community of property in the 1960s, as highly influential on the reform process. 
129. See M. RIVET, « L a popularité des différents régimes matrimoniaux depuis la réforme 
de 1970», (1974) 15 C. de D. 613. This study was undertaken at the behest of the C.C.R.O. 
to determine whether spouses were adopting the partnership of acquests. 
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cultural monolith, and it may be that a single norm for sharing essential 
assets did not allow for the multiple patrimoines familiaux generated by 
informal law to constitute an effective codification of existing practice. 
Assuming informal law does consecrate a norm for sharing in marriage 
with which the family patrimony can be allied, there is no reason to believe 
that the customary rule is of even application across Quebec. While the 
family patrimony, as one of a series of mandatory effects of marriage, is 
unforgivingly uniform, informal law can be expected to be more sensitive to 
uneven attitudes to family property throughout Quebec. Unlike state-made 
law, everyday law is not constrained by political geography or the chance 
boundaries of formal legal traditions. It seems inevitable that in Quebec, as 
elsewhere, regional and cultural attitudes to family property will vary and 
thus so too will the practice of sharing property. Notaries in France have 
long recognized regionalisms in their matrimonial property law—northern 
France tending to community of property ; whereas communauté univer-
selle predominates in the east ; and separatist matrimonial property regimes 
are said to be disproportionately popular in the south and west130. In the 
same way, there is no reason to think that the social group around which 
custom coalesces in Quebec will coincide with the whole of Quebec society, 
whether the variables be geographic, economic, or some other facet of 
cultural life. By way of example, informal matrimonial law might be expect-
ed to have its own edit de secondes noces whereby spouses in second or 
subsequent marriages who are less concerned with establishing homes and 
families practise sharing property differently131 Whether unevenness oc-
curs on this basis or according to other cultural variables there is certainly 
no reason to assume that customary norms acquire their obligatory force in 
social groups identical to that represented by the state132 Informal law may 
align itself instead with autonomous institutions and groups creating in 
130. See G. CHARRAS and D. DUMAN, «Patrimoine et mariage», in Couples et modernité: 
gestion et transmission du patrimoine, op. cit., note 97, p. 39. For an example of a struggle 
between the boundaries of formal and informal law in family property law, see 
D. BASTIAN and A. WEILL, « Une tentative d'unification législative entre le droit français 
général et le droit local d'Alsace et de Lorraine: le régime matrimonial», in Études 
juridiques offertes à Léon Julliot de la Morandière, Paris, Dalloz, 1964, p. 23. 
131. See the arguments of academic and notary P. LAQUERRE, «Mémoire sur les droits 
économiques des conjoints », unpubl., Quebec City, 1988, p. 5, before the parliamentary 
commission in support of the view that property is shared on a « separatist » basis in 
second and subsequent marriages with no children. 
132. This point is explained by J. GILISSEN, «La coutume: essai de synthèse générale», in 
La coutume 4e partie, Recueil de la société Jean Bodin, vol. 54, 1989, p. 445, who noted 
that custom arises in respect of a «groupe social donné» which has no necessary 
relationship with the State. 
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some instances microlegal systems within the nation-state133, or macrolegal 
systems extending beyond it. 
The mandatory character of the family patrimony has patience for none 
of these niceties, choosing a single norm, within a fixed pattern for variation, 
for all Quebec marriages134. While it is no doubt impossible to allow for all 
the variables of informal law in provisions that are designed to be of public 
order, it may be that the designated «common ground» for all Quebec 
marriages was mischosen. Sociologists have remarked on multiple defini-
tions for economic partnerships providing different models for marriage 
which can coexist within a given society, each anchored in a defensible 
socio-cultural reality135. Arguably the legislature had an obligation to isolate 
precisely the «consensus sociologique», to return to Carbonnier's phrase, 
if it had any hope of the family patrimony meeting popular favour. Of 
course, the legislature may not have sought to coat-tail onto existing every-
day law, but lead — or put on the brakes — by way of example. But even if 
this was the case, radically original law reform—if we can style it so—is a 
perilous affair. Where a legislature imposes an invention of positive law 
without regard to existing informal law, it may find that the « new » law 
never properly takes root136. Everyday law, including customary law of 
family property, is a powerful thing, arguably even more potent than rules 
of public order found in a civil code. The relevant question for Quebec law 
reformers, whether looking at the law of family property before or after the 
advent of arts 414 and following, should be the same : what law brings about 
sharing in marriage ? 
133. For a splendid account of this phenomenon, with examples taken from family law, see 
W.O. WEYRAUCH and M.A. BELL, «Autonomous Lawmaking : The Case of the Gyp-
sies», (1993) 103 Yale L.J. 323, 326-331. 
134. It is of course wrong to see the family patrimony as a uniform norm for sharing, despite 
its mandatory character. The rules for calculation of the net value of the mass, especially 
since they were amended by S.Q. 1990, c. 18, give rise to immense variation, both in the 
size of the mass and its relationship to excluded property, from marriage to marriage. 
Moreover renunciation is contemplated, albeit in a limited cadre (arts 423-424 C.C.). 
135. See, e.g., for Switzerland, J. KELLERHALS et al, « Les couples et leur justice », Autre-
ment, n° 105, 1989, pp. 105-107. 
136. The classical treatment of this problem is offered by legal anthropologists: see, e.g., 
T.O. ELIAS, «The Problem of Reducing Customary Law to Writing» [1958], reprinted 
in A.D. RENTELN and A. DUNDES (eds.). Folk Law: Essays on Theory and Practice of 
Lex Non Scripta, New York, Garland, 1994, pp. 320-321. 
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2.2 Sources of opinio juris Requiring Spouses 
to Share the Family Patrimony 
An image is beginning to take shape of two parallel bodies of family 
property law for marriage. First is that of formal matrimonial law, reflecting 
the state-made legal order which comprises the texts of law of property, 
matrimonial regimes and marriage contracts, the primary regime and, as of 
1989, the family patrimony. Shadowing the formal law and, on occasion, 
overlapping with it, is the informal matrimonial law that flows forth from 
spousal practices which generate everyday funds of family property and 
other customary manifestations of the patrimoine familial. The rules of the 
family patrimony may be on the cusp between law of the made and everyday 
varieties, part of an overlay between these collateral orders whereby the 
legislature endeavoured to follow the dictates of informal law in con-
structing the state-made machinery for economic equality in marriage137. To 
complicate matters more, there are further bodies of family property law 
originating elsewhere that must be identified and factored into the Quebec 
legal order as part of a full understanding the law of the patrimoine 
familial139. 
This expansive sense of the sources of matrimonial law is understood, 
it would seem, by everyone but the lawyers139. There is no doubt that 
prevailing attitudes in respect of the theory of sources of the Civil law, at 
least as related by the twentieth century professional literature, rank custom 
behind written law. Opinions vary, but civilian enthusiasts for informal law 
are not in the ascendant140, and some perspectives are radically dismissive 
137. Occasionally, theorists present both these phenomena as manifestations of «positive 
law», often in aid of the argument that state-made law trumps everyday law within a 
single legal order: see, e.g., B.S. MARCOVKÎ, «De la dualité du droit positif», (1995) 1, 
R.I.D.C. 138, 139. 
138. Religious law, both institutional and popular, includes rules of family property that can 
influence, alongside and at times intersecting with state-made law, how persons bound 
up in love-relationships share wealth. For an evocation of this idea for Quebec, see 
D. LEMIEUX, «La religion populaire et les classes sociales — Quelques réflexions», in 
B. LACROIX and J. SIMARD, (eds.), Religion populaire, religion des clercs ?, Quebec City, 
Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1984, p. 297. 
139. There are many exceptions, including imaginative French expert G. CORNU , Les régimes 
matrimoniaux, 7th ed., Paris, PUF, 1995, pp. 38-43, who has recognized the complex 
matrix of sources as including «la science des notaires et la pratique du ménage». 
140. But see H. LÉVY-BRUHL, Sociologie du droit, 4e éd., Paris, PUF, 1971, pp. 40-41, who 
argued the minority position forcefully in presenting the view that all law can be reduced 
to custom, and, for the same perspective with examples from the family law setting, 
R. DEKKERS, «Moïse», in Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean Dabin, Brussels, Bruylant, 
1963, p. 79. 
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of custom141. In the main, Quebec lawyers give in to the temptation to see 
legislation as snuffing out the custom extant at the time of enactment, 
notwithstanding the local lessons of the history of sources of law in its codai 
expression. Even jurists who admit the usefulness of custom find it hard to 
contemplate it alongside of state-made law on an identical topic. There is a 
strong lawyerly sense, as Weber has pointed out, that « [t]outes les codifi-
cations déclarent la guerre au droit coutumier142 ». This would encourage 
the view that the advent of the Civil Code's family patrimony has displaced 
customary law's patrimoine familial insofar as the two speak to the same 
idea. 
Yet it is only a conventional, modernist prejudice that associates state 
law with advanced ideas and customary law with primitive ones143 : made 
law is, to revert to a Lon Fullerism, not an answer to the question « what 
is law ? » but just a why-stopper. The necessary predominance of formal 
over informal law is especially hard to justify on the basis of any real 
life sense about how people behave and feel bound to behave — « le droit 
instinctif» remarked Lambert at a time that this kind of world view 
was particularly unpopular, «n ' a jamais cessé d'avoir une place à côté 
du droit de réflexion144». Even Quebec's new Civil Code recognizes a 
place for custom in the legal order145, although not without some mixed 
141. See, e.g,, B. NICHOLAS, The French Law of Contract, London, Butterworths, 1982, p. 5, 
who sketches the primacy of « legislation » in the French theory of sources as follows : 
« In the conventional French analysis there are only two sources of law : legislation and 
custom. The latter is only interstitial and in the present context can be ignored. » 
142. M. WEBER, Sociologie du droit, transi, by J. Grosclaude, Paris, PUF, 1986, p. 204. For 
a confirmation of Weber's sad suspicion, see M.I. DE KOSCHEMBAHR-LYSKOWSKI, «Le 
Code civil et la coutume. Révision de la notion de coutume », in Études de droit civil à 
la mémoire de Henri Capitant, Paris, Dalloz, 1939, pp. 412-415. 
143. This reductionist view of custom is often presented in sophisticated terms: see, e.g., 
A. WATSON, «An Approach to Customary Law», (1984) 3 Univ. III. L. Rev. 561. But 
see, for the counterpoint, A. ALLOTT, « Popular Law Making in Western Society », in 
A. ALLOTT and G.R. WOODMAN (eds.), People's Law and State Law The Bellagio 
Papers, Dordrecht, Foris Pub., 1985, p. 13, who bases his argument as to the vigour of 
informal law in industrialized countries largely on family property law. 
144. É. LAMBERT, op. cit., note 81, p. vi. For the (post) modern perspective, see B.S. JACKSON, 
« Code and Custom », in R. KEVELSON (ed.), Codes and Customs Millenial Perspectives, 
New York, Peter Lang, 1994, 119, p. 135 : «for all the modern privileging of code over 
custom, the latter — the uncontrollable internalization of the social — is necessarily im-
plicated in all our legal problems». (The term «code» is used in a non-civilian sense.) 
145. See, e.g., the recognition of a body of «customary international law» at art. 2807 C.C. 
The best textual argument in favour of the recognition of lex non scripta in the Civil 
Code of Québec is perhaps found in its Preliminary Provision, including the reference 
to extra codai « general principles of law ». 
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signals146. To return to the context of family property, one might test 
whether customary law can coexist alongside the family patrimony by 
asking why spouses share the net value of essential family assets from 
the twin perspectives of formal and informal law. Does the opinio juris 
that one must share come from the texts of the Code, as imposed—if it 
comes to that—by a court ? Is the conviction that one must share rooted 
instead in the lex non scripta of the family ? It is a bit of both ? 
Ironically, while there is a broadly felt indifference, if not to say hostil-
ity, towards the idea that the patrimonial law of the family may be created 
spontaneously, there is a strong sense among lawyers that law — that is to 
say enacted law — cannot properly explain spousal behaviour in respect of 
family property. Rather than acknowledge that formal law does not repre-
sent the full normative texture of matrimonial property law, experts gen-
erally prefer to explain its apparent disfunctional character by invoking 
libertarian values connected to the privacy of family living. La famille 
heureuse ne connaît pas de droit, says an old French saw, which has 
currency among lawyers as a means of accounting for the apparent break-
down of the Rules when the family is in circumstances other than that of 
apparent breakdown147. The same kind of adage is invoked by positivists of 
various political stripe for their own purposes in differing accounts of family 
law. Conservatives lay claim to it to justify keeping « law » (and by neces-
sary implication, the state) out of the bedrooms and the joint bank accounts 
of the nation ; progressives invoke the same idea to denounce the family as 
an impenetrable hell {i.e. impenetrable to «law » and thus to state action) in 
which lawlessness leaves economically vulnerable actors free to be exploit-
ed. Crits and free-market family lawyers find themselves in an unholy 
alliance bemoaning or celebrating as the case may be a world without 
« law » 
This unlikely union is cemented by a same and, frankly, impoverished 
conception of family law as an exclusively state-generated body of rules. To 
say that a happy — or muzzled—family « knows no law » is a crazy idea to 
the everyday lawyer who sees the family (happy or otherwise) as rife with 
146. The word «custom», which appears relatively frequently in the English text (see, e.g., 
976, 2004, 2025, 2027, 2062, 2064 C.C.), is matched with its distant cousin «usage » in 
the French, creating an opportunity for law and non-law to meet in argument before the 
courts. Both terms appear in both linguistic texts of art. 1139, para. 25 to complicate the 
law of usufruct. 
147. P. MALAURIE, Cours de droit civil: la famille, 2nd ed., Paris, Éditions Cujas, 1990, 
para. 15, explained this view as follows : « [l]es idylles et la famille heureuse se passent 
parfaitement du droit». Note, however, his presentation of a counterpoint at para. 21. 
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rules of everyday law. At best the view that law cannot explain behaviour 
in family life is an admission of the limits of state-made law as an account 
of legal relations in the family — as one French jurist has observed, « [i]l est 
vrai que les « familles heureuses » ont rarement affaire à la justice ; cela ne 
signifie nullement qu'elles échappent au droit148 ». It is far more plausible to 
see informal law completing the account, positively flourishing in the family 
setting where social ordering proceeds otherwise than on a wholly legisla-
tive basis149. State law may abandon the family but, as Jean Carbonnier has 
explained, it does not leave it to the « chaos d'un vide normatif, mais aux 
régulations moins mécanistes que les hommes ont toujours su se donner en 
dehors de l'autorité publique150». 
Indeed it would seem that, if anything, the family is an especially fertile 
ground for the emergence of everyday norms given that it is custom, as 
Fuller argued, that better designate the roles and functions so central to the 
legal relations in family matters than do the word-heavy, non-narrative 
directives of state law151. Experts have fixed on the relevance of custom to 
the extra-patrimonial side of family living in accounts of the law relating to, 
for example, the name152, divorce153 and parent-child relations154. More 
obviously, where positive law abandons a sphere of family relations be-
cause of its own short-sightedness, informal law moves in to fill the gap or, 
148. H. GAUDEMET-TALLON, «De quelques paradoxes en matière de droit de la famille», 
(1981) 80 R.T.D.C. 719, 721, who was, it should be noted, not writing on customary law. 
But in this prescient paper, the author astutely saw the « incompatibilité d 'humeur entre 
la notion de famille et celle de droit » (p. 720), and suggested that the latter idea must be 
rethought in the family context. 
149. For a further suggestion that the « flou amiable » existing during marriage is a normative 
phenomenon, see G. CORNU, op. cit., note 139, pp. 29-30. 
150. J. CARBONNIER, « Préface [to special issue devoted to reform in family law] », (1975) 20 
Arch. phil. dr. 1, 3. 
151. L. FULLER, loc. cit., note 17, 243. 
152. See, e.g., S. SHINDLER-VIGUIE, « L a liberté du nom des personnes physiques», (1994) 
114 Rép. du Not. Défrenoss 1409 and references therein. For an early suggestion in 
Quebec law, see J. BEETZ, «Attribution et changement du nom patronymique», (1956) 
16 R. du B. 56, 59. 
153. See, e.g., M. RHEINSTEIN, «Our Dual Law of Divorce: The Law in Action versus the 
Law in Books», in Marriage, Stability, Divorce and the Law, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1972, p. 51. 
154. Raised by J. VANDERLINDEN, « Vers une nouvelle conception du pluralisme juridique », 
(1993) R.R.J. 573, 575-578, whose perspective stands in happy contrast to the view of 
parent-child relations as a closed world where law cannot reach. In respect of an 
obligation of support in the absence of a formal bond of filiation, see D. GOUBAU, « Le 
caractère contraignant de l'obligation alimentaire des parents psychologiques», (1991) 
51 R. du B. 625, 628, 642-643. 
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more precisely, informal law stands alone, unobscured by text. The plainest 
example is the legal account of relations between de facto spouses155. Indeed 
the very expression de facto union is another misnomer : it is a union of 
law, of course, and not of mere « fact », notwithstanding the virtual silence, 
in Quebec at any rate, of the droit commun156. Informal law essentially 
occupies the field for family living in same-sex unions157, family relations 
based on minority conceptions of kinship158 and among people who live on 
the street159. It is perhaps not surprising that where family life is on the 
margins of society as imagined by the state through law, custom will have 
free reign. But this hardly excuses the lawyers for their disinterest in the 
everyday law of the family. 
Not only is it plausible that formal and informal rules for family prop-
erty coexist, but it may be that they feed upon one another as enacted law 
stimulates new customary practice and custom moves the legislature to 
recast its texts160. By the same token, formal law can be deployed by the 
state in an effort to contain or reorient everyday law. This seems very likely 
to have been part of the project of the Dorion Commission in the 1930s when 
conservative law reformers sought to curtail practical advances of married 
155. For an avant-gardiste suggestion, see A. LEBRUN, La coutume, ses sources, ses autorités 
en droit privé, Paris, LGDJ, 1932, para. 413. 
156. M.A. GLENDON, «La transformation des rapports entre l'État et la famille dans l'évo-
lution actuelle du droit aux États-Unis», m Journées Jean Dabin, op. cit., note 61, p. 18, 
makes the point that de facto union obeys « son propre corps de droit ». See, for Quebec, 
M. GAUTHIER, «L'union libre, un état de droit, un état de fait, un état ambigu?», in 
SERVICE DE LA FORMATION PERMANENTE, BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, Nouveaux dévelop-
pements en droit familial, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Biais, 1989, p. 223. 
157. See É. DELEURY, «L'union homosexuelle et le droit de la famille», (1984) 25 C. de D. 
751 ; S. ALLARD, «Effets civils et organisation conventionnelle de l'union homo-
sexuelle», (1985)26 C. de D. 451 ; and A. ROBINSON, «Lesbiennes, mariage et famille», 
(1994) 2 C.J.W.L. 393, 395-397. 
158. See, for Quebec, R. DAGENAIS, «Le droit de la famille autochtone», in ASSOCIATION 
HENRI-CAPITANT, Droit civil et droits autochtones, Montreal, Association Henri-Capi-
tant (section québécoise), 1991, p. 25. For an uncommonly sensitive judge's perspective 
on customary adoption and its relationship with state law, seeRe Katies Adoption, (1961) 
38 W.W.R. 100, 103 (Sisson J.) (N.W.T. Terr. Court). 
159. See C. JENCKS, The Homeless, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994, chap. 7: 
« Social Ties and Family Ties». There is, of course, ample reason to see the complex 
relations of love, hate and kinship that grow out of street life as regulated by law within 
a microlegal system. 
160. This phenomenon has best been observed in various fields of commercial law. See 
generally, in a civilian context, B. OPPETIT, «Sur la coutume en droit privé», (1986) 3 
Droits 39, 41s. For a recent account of the ways in which formal law can incorporate 
informal law and vice versa, see A. JACOBSON, «The Other Path of Law», (1994) 103 
Yale L.J. 2213, 2215 s. 
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women's rights and powers by the token recognition of property reserved 
to the administration of married women161. On the other hand, legal anthro-
pologists have remarked on how a more sophisticated and culturally-aware 
body of customary law can bend state-made law out of its intended shape162 
or, in some cases, leave it entirely behind163. One particularly telling 
example of this dissonance between formal and informal norms is to be 
found in accounts of family property law in planned economies where the 
cult of the State and the cult of Law constantly failed to coincide, revealing 
the vibrancy of custom164. For present purposes, Quebec matrimonial law 
provides occasions to test for the presence of the phenomenon, notably the 
premature demise of dower165, and the failure of reserved property to 
« save » community of property from desuetude166. 
There seems no reason to believe, as a matter of principle, that the 
mere presence of rules of enacted law, even in a civil code, displaces 
everyday law167. The two regimes may entertain a peaceful coexistence, 
complementing one another to make up a bigger picture as to what the law 
in the broadest sense means to family finances. But, as we have seen, 
161. See, in the report of the Commissioners, the explicit acknowledgment that the law had 
to change so that the family would remain the same : COMMISSION DES DROITS CIVILS 
DE LA FEMME, loc. cit., note 127, 230-233. 
162. É. LEROY, «Le Code Napoléon révélé par l'Afrique», in J. FRÉBAULT (ed.), Un droit 
inviolable et sacré: la propriété, Paris, ADEF, 1991, p. 145, on how land law as imagined 
by the Napoleonic-Code exporting industry acclimatized poorly to customary rules for 
land-use in French colonial Africa. 
163. See A.N. ALLOTT, « The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa », 
[1957] reprinted in A.D. RENTELN and A. DUNDES, op. cit., note 136, p. 308 s. 
164. Even apologists for planned economies seem to acknowledge this. See, for family 
property law in the People's Republic of China, TSIEN Tche-hao, « L'influence politico-
économique dans la transformation du système familial chinois», in Journées Jean 
Dabin, op. cit., note 61, 121, para. 47-49. For a more complete overview of disorder 
inherent in formal sources of law and its contrast to the « normative strength » of folk 
law in Chinese society, see P. KELLER, « Sources of Order in Chinese Law », (1994) 42 
Am. J. Comp. L. 711, 711-713 and 731-738. 
165. While dower (styled «customary dower» by former art. 1426 C.C.L.C.) was formally 
abolished by S.Q. 1969, c. 77, complications surrounding its registration meant that it was 
said to have been systematically avoided by spouses and their notaries several genera-
tions before: see M. CASTELLI, «Le douaire en droit coutumier ou la déviation d'une 
institution», (1979) 20 C. de D. 315, 328-330. 
166. In France, the history of the parallel provisions to former arts 1425a C.C.L.C. et seq. 
provoked G. LEPOINTE, «La femme: deuxième partie», Recueil de la société Jean 
Bodin, vol. 12, 1962, p. 506, to comment « il y a parfois loin du texte officiel à la pratique ». 
167. For a useful overview, from a civilian perspective, of the various relationships custom 
may entertain with codified law, see C. JOURNÈS, «Introduction», in La coutume et la 
loi: étude d'un conflit, Lyons, Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1986, p. 9 s. 
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custom may not be praeter legem. Where the family patrimony finds itself 
in conflict with existing informal law, the cohabitation becomes more shy-
making. The state has said in no uncertain terms that its standards for 
economic equality are not negotiable and, by dint of the public order char-
acter of the new rules, it has announced that it will not tolerate less than this 
standard. What do the spouses do when they are pulled one way by the 
imperative effects of marriage in the Civil Code and yet another by the 
imperatives of custom ? 
It is indeed the public order character of articles 414 to 426 that render 
the custom contra legem particularly vulnerable to being trumped. The 
«embarras extrême», as it has been so aptly styled168, of custom that is in 
irreconcilable conflict with state-made law has haunted some enthusiasts of 
everyday law who have retreated to the view that mandatory law causes 
custom contra legem to give way. But once again the problem can be 
overstated in undue deference to text. In a conflict between state law and 
custom, the key question is not whether or not the former has a mandatory 
character, but instead whether the people to whom it is directed understand 
that to be so. Thus marriage may be deemed indissoluable except by death, 
as it has been in many jurisdictions throughout this century, but couples 
nevertheless continued to « divorce » on the basis of a recognizable body of 
informal law169. Customary adoption rides roughshod over the public order 
rules of filiation, not just among certain aboriginal peoples in Quebec, but in 
places which are, theoretically, as culturally proximate to the Civil Code as 
the Beauce170. Marriage itself may follow the dictates of customary law in 
168. J. COMBACAU, «Ouverture [of special issue devoted to custom] : de la régularité à la 
règle», (1986) 3 Droits 3, 7. Combacau's own sympathy for custom as a source of law 
is no doubt nourished by his principal domain of research, public international law, 
where the nagging absence of a constitutionally recognized legislature has always given 
customary role a visible place in the theory of sources of law. For a fascinating review 
of custom in international law drawing on French civilian sources, see P.E. BENSON, 
« François Gény's Doctrine of Customary Law » (1982) 20 Can. Yb. Int'lL. 267 (reprinted 
in A.D. RENTELN and A. DUNDES, op. cit., note 136, p. 883). 
169. See H.H. FOSTER, Jr. «Common Law Divorce», (1961)46Minn. L. Rev. 43, 58-66, where 
an author builds on Eugen Ehrlich's theory of « living law » in arguing for the existence 
of an informal law of divorce for the poor and divorceless in the United States. For a 
hint of this in Quebec, see A. MAYRAND, «Les conventions de séparation », (1960) 20 
R. duB. 1,3-7 and 20-24. Note however the interdiction for divorce at the time the latter 
article was written was itself part of a lex non scripta, relevant only for a part of the 
Quebec population. 
170. See M. FERRON and R. CLICHE, Les Beaucerons ces insoumis, suivi de Quand le peuple 
fait la loi, Montreal, Hurturbise, HMH, 1982, pp. 291-295, in which adoption by a 
grandmother of the child of her minor daughter is presented as a ritual having informal 
legal character. 
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preference to the mandatory rules of state law171. One way of understanding 
the legal emancipation of married women in Quebec is to argue that the 
public order incapacity had been eclipsed by everyday law well before its 
final abolition in 1964172. In these instances, informal law is more potent 
than the mandatory injunction of the state and continues to flourish not-
withstanding the constitutionally valid rule of positive law. 
Have Quebeckers abandoned the Civil Code's family patrimony in 
favour of an informal legal regime more in step with prevailing sentiments 
for sharing property in marriage and at marriage's end? Strongly-stated 
objections to the family patrimony, coming from the highest authorities, 
have anticipated that the new rules pose a threat to the ordinary pursuit of 
family life. The Chamber of Notaries warned that when Quebec spouses 
came to understand the affront the family patrimony represented to their 
personal freedom they would choose to avoid marriage altogether173. 
Leading author Jean Pineau has argued that spouses will soon begin to 
arrange their affairs with a view to avoiding the effect of the mandatory 
rules ; and while there are no reports that sales of gold bullion have outstrip-
ped the sales of family homes, some early cases would suggest that Profes-
sor Pineau's predictions were not inaccurate174. Yet it is worth noting that 
however strong this sense of the inappropriate character of the family 
patrimony might be, it is premissed on the view that the rules of positive law 
will take root and effectively regulate those subject to them. In other words, 
the Chamber of Notaries and other critics assumed that, once enacted, the 
family patrimony would direct the behaviour of spouses who by virtue of 
their marriage would be legislatively held to its terms. The other rules of 
171. For an historical account of how marriage celebrated according to popular custom 
persisted despite a legislative prohibition in Japan, see S. ANAN, «Mariage extra legem 
et la notion de droit au Japon», in Mélanges en l'honneur de Paul Roubier, t. 1, Paris, 
Dalloz et Sirey, 1961, p. 3-4. 
172. This was the position of advocates W.M. HOLMES and J. GILCHRIST, YOU and Your 
Family under Quebec Law, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1954, pp. 5-6: «married 
women do not realize that in many cases the « letter of the law » is no longer followed. 
Certain incapacities have become obsolete in practice [...] The Civil Code of the Province 
of Quebec no longer defines the true status of the married woman in Quebec. » 
173. In favour, one presumes, of the more socially acceptable dictates of the everyday law 
of the de facto union! See the indictment of Bill 146 in CHAMBRE DES NOTAIRES, 
« Mémoire portant sur « Les droits économiques des conjoints » », unpubl., Montreal, 
1988, p. 23. 
174. See J. PINEAU, loc. cit., note 9, 123-124. The case reports indeed record instances where 
division of the family patrimony is alleged to be unjust under art. 422 C.C. because a 
spouse sought to circumvent the rules : see, e.g., Droit de la famille —1941, [1994] R.D.F. 
118 (Sup. Ct.). 
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family property law, including custom, would give way, trumped by the rules 
of public order. 
While the disputes in the reported cases as to how the family patrimony 
operates would suggest to the casual reader that the new rules have indeed 
taken root notwithstanding the brouhaha surrounding their enactment, the 
reality might in fact be otherwise. The family patrimony is, of course, 
designed to be self-executing. As family finances are dismantled by the 
spouses themselves or even where liquidation is engineered by counsel, is it 
possible that the parties revert to their own understanding of what would be 
a just division of the patrimoine familial—and the family patrimony—that 
would not necessarily coincide with that suggested by the texts. In this case, 
the spouses lay to one side rules of mandatory state law which, for them, are 
animated by an opinio juris less compelling than the rules of popular custom. 
While there is, as has recently been said of the French legal system, some 
« lèse-majesté » in the suggestion that custom trumps imperative law, socio-
logical study of the unravelling of finances far from the courthouse may 
reveal that, as was the case for Roman law for a spell in medieval French 
legal history coutume passe loi115. 
Conclusion 
Much of this essay has made light of the assertion that the family 
patrimony has, as advertised, transformed the economic partnership of 
marriage. Yet by rethinking the sources of family property law, it does seems 
plausible that the amendments to the Civil Code of Québec gave expression 
to a legal basis for sharing property already present in a combination of 
state-made law and custom in force at the time its enactment. It may be 
genuinely new law in the minds of its masters, but the family patrimony has 
similarities with shared-property regimes of the general law that cannot be 
ignored. And even if the novelty is reduced to manner {i.e. rules of public 
order) and form (i.e. technique copied from Common law family assets 
legislation), the legislature made no effort to inquire how spouses in Quebec 
already shared property as a matter of informal law when putting the reform 
in place. By turning to Ontario as an alternative to measuring the living 
law in Quebec, law-makers may have forgotten to consider how sharing 
proceeded according to local knowledge. 
175. See H. ROLAND and L. BOYER, Locutions latines et adages du droit français contem-
porain, 3rd ed., Paris, Litec, 1993, pp. 121-124, where this adage is rehabilitated in service 
of a modern argument in favour of the validity of the custom contra legem. 
N. KASIRER Family Patrimony 839 
The technical connections to the law of Equity in its statutory guise 
would tend to confirm rather than upset the idea that the family patrimony 
may have roots in local customary law. In the Common law cases where 
equitable title to property is recognized for women as a remedy against 
unjust enrichment by their partners, it takes the resources of the Chancellor 
to see the true family character of property that, from the perspective of 
formal law, is owned by their husbands or de facto husbands. While the 
Civil law's unitary conception of ownership is not, in theory, susceptible of 
division into legal and equitable title, it may be that in the past, like Equity 
in the Common law tradition, custom recognized that married women 
owned a share of their husbands' property where the formal law did not, 
especially for women separate as to property. In fact prior to the enactment 
of the family patrimony, the richness, imagination and morality of the 
Equity's invention for the sharing of title may have been present, if occult-
ed, in the combination of the formal rules of the shared-property regimes 
and patterns of spousal behaviour which make up the living sources of 
Quebec family property law. It would seem that in the Civil law, the genius 
of Chancery is to be found in part outside the Civil Code in the fibre of 
customary law. 
Most experts have viewed the rules of the family patrimony as spring-
ing to life as marriage itself expires and, indeed, the formal texts provide the 
spouses with little or no real sense of the encumbrance that the family 
patrimony can represent before the triggering events mentioned at art. 416 
C.C. Invented to correct inequalities at the end of marriage, the family 
patrimony appears unconnected to the everyday law that regulates marriage 
as an on-going venture. Yet even if one takes the extreme view that the 
family patrimony exists merely for the financial consequences of death, 
divorce, separation and annulment, it may be still be understood in light of 
an informal law of marriage breakdown176. Moreover, if the family patri-
mony is linked to a lived economic partnership, the new texts may simply 
carry forward the sharing the spouses established before breakdown into 
the new family setting that death or divorce brings about. This is certainly 
the case of the policy underlying new device, described by its inventors as 
« le prolongement, au moment de la dissolution du mariage, du principe de 
l'égalité des époux pendant le mariage177». Indeed the provisions of the 
176. There may well be a distinct body of customary law for family breakdown, just as there 
is one in respect of marriage itself, which regulates conflicts in ways in which the texts 
do not explicitly contemplate. See J. TENBROEK, «California's Dual System of Family 
Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (Part III)», (1965) Stanf. L. Rev. 614, 
617-621. 
177. H. MARX and M. GAGNON-TREMBLAY, op. cit., note 111, p. 17. 
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Civil Code appear to confirm this : while the partition of the family patrimo-
ny is linked to the formal end of the vie commune, the calculation of its value 
is premissed upon the marriage as it was lived as a joint economic en-
deavour. 
If the legislative design of the family patrimony does seek to mimic the 
property arrangement that the informal law of marriage brings about, the 
objections concerning the extent of the « net family patrimony » should, as 
a consequence, be rethought as a failed appreciation by law reformers of this 
existing everyday law. What can make the division of the family patrimony 
just, in the eyes of the spouses, is that it tracks a concept of acquest property 
that reflects how their marriage genuinely operated as a partnership. Thus, 
where the equal partition of the net value of the mass, as calculated by 
articles 414 to 418 C.C., falls outside their own understanding of what the 
family fund resembled during the marriage, one or another spouses can be 
expected to object in the formal and informal avenues provided by law178. 
By attributing opinio juris to the sentimental instinct that motivates 
much of the sharing in marriage, I have no doubt adopted what for many 
readers will be too generous a definition of family property law. There is 
indeed a great danger for the self-styled pluralists, as the more sober of their 
number are careful to point out, that they characterize phenomena as legal 
which are not usefully thought of as partaking of law at all. The ardour for 
informal law is a bit of a disease, as one of its most adept Quebec practitio-
ners has pointed out to fellow-travellers179, and one may easily fall prey to 
the excesses of « panjuridisme180 ». Taking the measure of what the spouses 
themselves consider to be their legal obligations in respect of family prop-
erty is plainly in order before the full ambit of the everyday law can be 
understood. But in anticipation of this sociological study, there is already a 
great deal of evidence that suggests ordering in the financial lives of married 
people is explained otherwise than through what Fuller called the « tinsel of 
legal form ». 
178. This is one way of understanding the motivation of the spouses who petitions the court 
for an unequal partition of the family patrimony on the basis of art. 422 C.C. In these 
circumstances, dividing the property according to the « letter of the law » would con-
stitute an « injustice», thereby entitling the judge to proceed otherwise. 
179. « If the doorways to the Law are so numerous as to be particular to each of us, then the 
Law is closed to all of u s» : R. JANDA, «What has emerged and what should we do 
about it ? », unpubl. manus. presented at colloquium « Théories et émergence du droit », 
Montreal, Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal, 31 March 1994, p. 1. 
180. J. CARBONNIER, «L'hypothèse du non-droit», in Flexible droit, op. cit., note 75, p. 24, 
used this term to describe the penchant of legal sociologists who see law created every 
time someone moves. 
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It is possible, of course, to suggest that this essay has mistaken mere 
convention or usage for law by losing sight of the role that sanction plays in 
making the law of family property work, particularly where the family is in 
breakdown. Sanction, as a measure of « what is law ? », is often invoked in 
argument against the existence of everyday law by asking the lawyerly 
question «would a judge recognize that as law ?181 ». But care should be 
taken not to confuse the question « what is law ? » with that very different 
one, « who says it is ? ». Sanction may be imposed elsewhere than in the 
courts182 and, in family property law, the definitive measure of what is 
constitutive of law insofar as sanction is at all relevant thereto is the 
sanction identified by the spouses who understand themselves to be subject 
to the rule. Where sharing does not proceed according to the full ambit of 
sources for family property law, marital life will change — it may even 
collapse—long before a judge enters the scene to observe the disaster and 
sort out the pieces, as judges do, with the rudimentary tools law gives them. 
Other sanctions may be less dramatic or less visible, but no less real. This is 
most important for customary law — it is, after all, « le monument que le 
peuple érige à sa gloire183», as two Quebeckers have noted, and not a 
monument the judges and other legal professionals erect in celebration of 
themselves. 
On the other hand, the data may show that the family patrimony is not 
the people's law after all but does, in fact, belong to the bureaucrats. 
Awaiting an answer, it is best to be cautious about using sociological 
jurisprudence to speak too boldly to the unspoken relationship between 
love and money in marriage. To get a jump on the critics, it might be wise to 
turn Gide's jibe pointed at an aristocrat savant on everyday lawyers. Like 
monsieur le comte on his one-day pass to a sociology conference in Les 
caves du Vatican, the pluralists have, it might be said, « sur des questions 
sociales plutôt des convictions que des compétences ». 
181. For the basis of a powerful answer, see H. HARTOG, «Pigs and Positivism», [1985] Wise. 
L Rev. 899, who argued that custom authorized and regulated the keeping of pigs in 
nineteenth century New York even when the judges explicitly refused to do so. It would 
seem that judges did not define what law was in that setting. Did sanction define it at 
all? 
182. For the classic exposition of this position by a French private lawyer, see H. LÉVY-
BRUHL, op. cit., note 140, p. 46: «ce qui la [la coutume] caractérise, c'est moins la 
sanction judiciaire que la vigueur de la réaction provoquée par sa violation ». 
183. M. FERRON and R. CLICHE, op. cit., note 165, p. 245. 
